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Wiretap Channels with Random States
Non-Causally Available at the Encoder
Ziv Goldfeld, Paul Cuff and Haim H. Permuter
Abstract
We study the state-dependent (SD) wiretap channel (WTC) with non-causal channel state information (CSI) at
the encoder. This model subsumes all other instances of CSI availability as special cases, and calls for an efficient
utilization of the state sequence both for reliability and security purposes. A lower bound on the secrecy-capacity, that
improves upon the previously best known result by Chen and Han Vinck, is derived based on a novel superposition
coding scheme. An example in which the proposed scheme achieves strictly higher rates is provided. Specializing the
lower bound to the case where CSI is also available to the decoder reveals that the lower bound is at least as good as
the achievable formula by Chia and El-Gamal, which is already known to outperform the adaptation of the Chen and
Han Vinck code to the encoder and decoder CSI scenario. Our achievability gives rise to the exact secrecy-capacity
characterization of a class of SD-WTCs that decompose into a product of two WTCs, one is independent of the state
and the other one depends only on it. The results are derived under the strict semantic-security metric that requires
negligible information leakage for all message distributions. The proof of achievability relies on a stronger version
of the soft-covering lemma for superposition codes.
Index Terms
Channel state information, Gelfand-Pinsker channel, semantic-security, soft-covering lemma, state-dependent
channel, superposition code, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliably transmitting a message over a noisy state-dependent (SD) channel with non-causal encoder channel state
information (CSI) is a fundamental information-theoretic problem. Its formulation and the derivation of capacity
dates back to Gelfand and Pinsker (GP) [1]. A key virtue of the GP model is its generality. Namely, it is the most
general instance of a SD point-to-point channel in which any or all of the terminals have non-causal access to
sequence of states. Motivated by the above and by the importance of security in modern communication systems,
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2we study the SD wiretap channel (WTC) with non-causal encoder CSI, which incorporates the notion of security
in the presence of a wiretapper into the GP channel coding paradigm.
Secret communication over noisy channels was pioneered by Wyner who introduced the degraded WTC and
derived its secrecy-capacity [2]. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner extended Wyner’s result to the non-degraded WTC [3]. These
two results formed the basis for the study of physical layer security and sprung a variety of works on related topic,
among which are SD-WTCs. The interest in WTCs with random states relates to the observation that knowledge
of state sequence may be exploited as an additional source of randomness to boost up secrecy performance. Doing
so oftentimes involves decorrelating the transmission and the state sequence so as to avoid leaking information that
might compromise security. Reliable transmissions over SD channels, on the other hand, favors coherent strategies
that correlate the channel input and the state. Resolving the tension between these two different utilizations of the
transmitter CSI is a key challenge in the considered communication scenario.
First to consider a discrete and memoryless (DM) WTC with random states were Chen and Han Vinck [4], who
studied the encoder CSI scenario. They established a lower bound on the secrecy-capacity based on a combination
of wiretap coding with GP coding (see also [5] for a special case where the WTC is driven by a pair of states,
one available to the encoder and the other one to the decoder). A more intricate coding scheme was proposed by
Chia and El-Gamal for the SD-WTC with causal encoder CSI and full decoder CSI [6]. Their idea was to explicitly
extract a cryptographic key from the random state, and protect a part of the confidential message via a one-time-pad
with that key. The remaining portion of the confidential message is protected through a wiretap code (whenever
wiretap coding is possible). Although their code is restricted to utilize the state in a causal manner, the authors of
[6] proved that it can strictly outperform the adaptations of the non-causal schemes from [4], [5] to the encoder
and decoder CSI setup. Other related directions of research include key-agreement over SD-WTCs by means of
non-causal encoder CSI [7], and action-dependent SD-WTCs [8], where the encoder can affect the formation of
the channel states by means of an action sequence (see also references therein).
In this paper we study the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI, for which we propose a novel superposition-
based coding scheme. The scheme results in a lower bound on the secrecy-capacity, which recovers the previously
best known achievability formulas from [4] and [5] as special cases. We show that the relation to the previous
schemes can be strict, i.e., an example is fashioned where our scheme achieves strictly higher secrecy rates than
[4], [5]. The example is a specific instance of a class of SD-WTC whose channel transition probability decomposes
into a WTC that is independent of the state and another channel that generates two noisy versions of the state,
each observed either by the legitimate receiver or by the eavesdropper. We show that when the WTC’s output
to the eavesdropper is less noisy than the one observed by the legitimate user, our lower bound is tight - thus
characterizing the secrecy-capacity.
When specializing to the case where the decoder also knows the state sequence, our achievability is shown
to be at least as good as the scheme from [6]. In fact, [6] provided two separate coding schemes and stated
their achievability result as the maximum between the two. Recovering [6] from our lower bound results in a
compact and simplified (yet equivalent) characterization of their achievable formula. Thus, our superposition-based
coding scheme encompasses a unification of the two schemes from [6]. Interestingly, while both schemes from
3[6] rely on generating the aforementioned cryptographic key, our code construction does not involve any explicit
key generation/agreement phase. Instead, we use an over-populated superposition codebook and encode the entire
confidential message at the outer layer. The transmission is correlated with the state sequence by means of the
likelihood encoder [9], while security is ensured by making the eavesdropper decode the inner layer codeword
that contains no confidential information. Having done so, the eavesdropper is lacking the resources to extract any
information about the secret message. A superposition-based code construction for secrecy purposes was considered
before in the context of lossy source coding in [10], where too the eavesdropper was compelled to decode a layer
that contains no useful information.
Our results are derived under the strict metric of semantic-security (SS). The SS criterion is a cryptographic
benchmark that was adapted to the information-theoretic framework (of computationally unbounded adversaries)
in [11]. In that work, SS was shown to be equivalent to a negligible mutual information between the message
and the eavesdropper’s observations for all message distributions. In contrast to our stringent security requirement,
all the aforementioned secrecy results were derived under the weak-secrecy metric, i.e., a vanishing normalized
mutual information with respect to a uniformly distributed message. Nowadays, however, weak-secrecy is widely
regarded as being too loose, giving rise to the recent effort of upgrading information-theoretic secrecy results to the
strong-secrecy metric (namely, by removing the normalization factor but keeping the uniformity assumption on the
message). SS is clearly a further strengthening of them both. Consequently, our achievability result outperforms the
schemes from [4], [5] for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI not only in terms of the achievable secrecy
rate, but also in the upgraded sense of security it provides. When CSI is also available at the decoder, our result
implies that an upgrade to SS is possible, without inflicting any loss of rate compared to [6].
While derivations of weak-secrecy largely rely on the groundwork laid by the early works Wyner [2] and Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [3], ensuring SS calls for stronger tools. In the spirit of our previous papers [12] and [13], the SS
analysis relies on a stronger version of the soft-covering lemma (SCL) for superposition codebooks given in [14,
Corollary VII.8]. Namely, we show that a random superposition codebook achieves the soft-covering phenomenon
with high probability. The probability of failure is doubly-exponentially small in the blocklength. The union bound
combined with some additional distribution approximation arguments is then used to establish SS. Our code is
also designed to produce an arbitrarily small maximal error probability via the expurgation method (e.g., cf. [15,
Theorem 7.7.1]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides notation and basic definitions and
properties. In Section III, we define the setup of soft-covering for superposition codebooks and state the strong
SCL. Section IV describes the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI and gives the lower bound on its SS-capacity.
In Section V we discuss the results and compare them to previous works. The same section also states some tight
SS-capacity results and contains the example that shows the superiority of our scheme compared to [4], [5]. Proofs
are provided in Section VI, while Section VII summarizes the main achievements and insights of this work.
4II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notations. As customary N is the set of natural numbers (which does not include 0),
while R denotes the reals. We further define R+ = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0} and R++ = {x ∈ R|x > 0}. Given two
real numbers a, b, we denote by [a : b] the set of integers
{
n ∈ N
∣∣⌈a⌉ ≤ n ≤ ⌊b⌋}. Calligraphic letters denote
sets, e.g., X , the complement of X is denoted by X c, while |X | stands for its cardinality. Xn denoted the n-fold
Cartesian product of X . An element of Xn is denoted by xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn); whenever the dimension n is
clear from the context, vectors (or sequences) are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., x. A substring of x ∈ Xn is
denoted by xji = (xi, xi+1, . . . , xj), for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n; when i = 1, the subscript is omitted. We also define
xn\i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Random variables are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X , with similar
conventions for random vectors.
Let
(
X ,F ,P
)
be a probability space, where X is the sample space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability
measure. Random variables over
(
X ,F ,P
)
are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X , with conventions for random
vectors similar to those for deterministic sequences. The probability of an event A ∈ F is denoted by P(A), while
P(A
∣∣B ) denotes conditional probability of A given Bn. We use 1A to denote the indicator function of A. The set
of all probability mass functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is denoted by P(X ), i.e.,
P(X ) =
{
P : X → [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
x∈X
P (x) = 1]
}
. (1)
PMFs are denoted by the uppercase letters such as P or Q, with a subscript that identifies the random variable
and its possible conditioning. For example, for a discrete probability space
(
X ,F ,P
)
and two correlated random
variables X and Y over that space, we use PX , PX,Y and PX|Y to denote, respectively, the marginal PMF of X ,
the joint PMF of (X,Y ) and the conditional PMF of X given Y . In particular, PX|Y represents the stochastic
matrix whose elements are given by PX|Y (x|y) = P
(
X = x|Y = y
)
. Expressions such as PX,Y = PXPY |X are
to be understood as PX,Y (x, y) = PX(x)PY |X(y|x), for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Accordingly, when three random
variables X , Y and Z satisfy PX|Y,Z = PX|Y , they form a Markov chain, which we denote by X − Y − Z . We
omit subscripts if the arguments of a PMF are lowercase versions of the random variables. The support of a PMF
P and the expectation of a random variable X are denoted by supp(P ) and E
[
X
]
, respectively.
For a discrete measurable space (X ,F), a PMF Q ∈ P(X ) gives rise to a probability measure on (X ,F), which
we denote by PQ; accordingly, PQ
(
A) =
∑
x∈AQ(x), for every A ∈ F . We use EQ to denote an expectation taken
with respect to PQ. For a random variable X , we sometimes write EX to emphasize that the expectation is taken
with respect to PX . For a sequence of random variable X
n, if the entries of Xn are drawn in an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner according to PX , then for every x ∈ X
n we have PXn(x) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) and
we write PXn(x) = P
n
X(x). Similarly, if for every (x,y) ∈ X
n×Yn we have PY n|Xn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi),
then we write PY n|Xn(y|x) = P
n
Y |X(y|x). We often use Q
n
X or Q
n
Y |X when referring to an i.i.d. sequence of
random variables. The conditional product PMF QnY |X given a specific sequence x ∈ X
n is denoted by QnY |X=x.
5The empirical PMF νx of a sequence x ∈ X
n is
νx(x) ,
N(x|x)
n
, (2)
where N(x|x) =
∑n
i=1 1{xi=x}. We use T
n
ǫ (PX) to denote the set of letter-typical sequences of length n with
respect to the PMF PX and the non-negative number ǫ [16, Chapter 3], i.e., we have
T nǫ (PX) =
{
x ∈ Xn
∣∣∣ ∣∣νx(x) − PX(x)∣∣ ≤ ǫPX(x), ∀x ∈ X}. (3)
Definition 1 (Relative Entropy) Let (X ,F) be a measurable space and let P and Q be two probability measures
on F , with P ≪ Q (i.e., P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q). The relative entropy between P and Q is
D(P ||Q) =
∫
X
dP log
(
dP
dQ
)
, (4)
where dP
dQ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative P with respect to Q. If the sample space X is countable and
P,Q ∈ P(X ), (4) reduces to
D(P ||Q) =
∑
x∈supp(P )
P (x) log
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)
. (5)
Definition 2 (Total Variation) Let (X ,F) be a measurable and P and Q be two probability measures on F . The
total variation between P and Q is
||P −Q||TV = sup
A∈F
∣∣P (A) −Q(A)∣∣. (6)
If the sample space X is countable and P,Q ∈ P(X ), (6) reduces to
||P −Q||TV =
1
2
∑
x∈X
∣∣P (x) −Q(x)∣∣. (7)
III. STRONG SOFT-COVERING LEMMA FOR SUPERPOSITION CODES
Our derivation of SS for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI relies on a new strong SCL (in the spirit
of [12], [13]) adjusted for superposition codebooks. The setup is illustrated in Fig. 1, where inner and outer layer
codewords are uniformly chosen from the corresponding codebook and passed through a DMC to produce and output
sequence. The induced distribution of the output should serve as a good approximation of a product distribution.
The approximation is in terms of relative entropy, which is shown to converge to 0 exponentially quickly with high
probability. The negligible probability is doubly-exponentially small with the blocklength n.
Fix QU,V,W ∈ P(U × V ×W) and let I and J be two independent random variables uniformly distributed over
In ,
[
1 : 2nR1
]
and Jn ,
[
1 : 2nR2
]
, respectively. Furthermore, let B
(n)
U ,
{
U(i)
}
i∈In
be a random inner layer
codebook which is a set of random vectors of length n that are i.i.d. according to QnU . A realization of B
(n)
U is
denoted by B
(n)
U ,
{
u(i)
}
i∈In
.
To describe the outer layer codebook, fix B
(n)
U and for every i ∈ In let B
(n)
V (i) ,
{
V(i, j)
}
j∈Jn
be a collection
of i.i.d. random vectors of length n with distribution QnV |U=u(i). A random outer layer codebook (with respect
to an inner codebook B
(n)
U ) is defined as B
(n)
V ,
{
B
(n)
V (i)
}
i∈In
. A realization of B
(n)
V (i), for i ∈ In is denoted
6
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(n)
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(n)
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(n)
V (i)
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(
I, J
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W |U,V
Inner Codebook
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W
Fig. 1. Superposition soft-covering setup with the goal of making P
(Bn)
W
≈ Qn
W
, where Bn =
{
B
(n)
U
,B
(n)
V
}
is a fixed superposition
codebook.
by B
(n)
V (i) ,
{
v(i, j,m)
}
j∈Jn
, respectively. We also use B
(n)
V to denote a realization of B
(n)
V . Thus, a random
superposition codebook is given by Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V
}
, while Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V
}
denotes a fixed codebook. Under
this construction, the joint probability of drawing a superposition codebook Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V
}
is
P
(
B
(n)
U = B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V = B
(n)
V
)
=
∏
i∈In
QnU
(
u(i)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
(
B
(n)
U
=B
(n)
U
)
∏
i′∈In

 ∏
j∈Jn
QnV |U
(
v(i′, j)
∣∣u(i′))


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
(
B
(n)
V =B
(n)
V
∣∣
BU=BU
)
. (8)
For a fixed superposition code Bn, the output sequence W is generated by independently drawing I and J from
In and Jn, respectively, and feeding u(i) and v(i, j,m) into the DMC Q
n
W |U,V . We denote the induced PMF on
In × Jn × U
n × Vn ×Wn by P (Bn), which is given by 1
P (Bn)(i, j,u,v,w) = 2−n(R1+R2)1{
u=u(i)
}
∩
{
v=v(i,j,m)
}QnW |U,V (w|u,v). (9)
Accordingly, the induced output distribution is
P (Bn)(w) =
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
2−n(R1+R2)QnW |U,V
(
w
∣∣u(i),v(i, j)) (10)
The strong SCL for superposition codes is stated next.
Lemma 1 (Strong Superposition Soft-Covering Lemma) For any QU , QV |U , QW |U,V , where |W| < ∞, and
(R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+ with
R1 > I(U ;W ) (11a)
R1 + R2 > I(U, V ;W ), (11b)
there exist γ1, γ2 > 0, such that for n large enough
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
W
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnW) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (12)
1To simplify notation, from here on out we assume that quantities of the form 2nR , where n ∈ N and R ∈ R+, are integers. Otherwise,
simple modifications of some of the subsequent expressions using floor operations are required.
7More precisely, for any δ1 ∈
(
0, R1 − I(U ;W )
)
and δ2 ∈
(
0, R1 + R2 − I(U, V ;W )
)
with δ1 < δ2 < 2δ1 and n
sufficiently large
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
W
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnW) ≥ cδ1,δ2n2−nγδ1,δ2
)
≤ 2nR2 · e−
1
32
nδ1
+ |W|n
[
2nR1e−2
n
δ2
2 + e−
1
32
n
δ2−δ1
2
]
, (13)
where
γδ1,δ2 = sup
α>1
min
{
β
(1)
α,δ1
, β
(2)
α,δ2
,
δ1
4
}
, (14a)
β
(1)
α,δ1
=
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R1 − δ1 − dα(QU,W , QUQW )
)
, (14b)
β
(2)
α,δ2
=
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R1 +R2 − δ2 − dα(QU,V,W , QU,VQW )
)
, (14c)
cδ1,δ2 = 4
(
log e+ 2 sup
α>1
min
{
β
(1)
α,δ1
, β
(2)
α,δ2
}
log 2
)
+ log e+ 2 log
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
)
, (14d)
and dα(µ, ν) =
1
α−1 log2
∫
dµ
(
dµ
dν
)1−α
is the Re´nyi divergence of order α.
The proof of the lemma is relegated to Section VI-A. The important quantity in the lemma above is γδ1,δ2 ,
which is the exponent that the soft-covering achieves. We see in (13) that the double-exponential convergence of
probability occurs for any (δ1, δ2) ∈ R
2
+ with δ1 < δ2 < 2δ1. Thus, the best soft-covering exponent that the lemma
achieves with confidence, over all such δ1 and δ2 values is
γ∗ = sup
(δ1,δ2)∈R
2
++:
δ1<δ2<2δ1
γδ1,δ2 . (15)
However, due to the structure of γδ1,δ2 the value of γ
∗ cannot be expressed in closed form. This is since while
δ1 → 0 achieves supδ1∈R++ β
(1)
α,δ1
, it clearly results in the right-hand side (RHS) of (14a) being zero.
Remark 1 The double-exponential confidence rates δ1 and δ2 act as a reduction in codebook rate R1 and the
sum of rates R1 + R2, respectively, in the definition of γδ. Consequently, γδ1 = 0 if either δ1 ≥ R1 − I(U ;W )
or δ2 ≥ R1 + R2 − I(U, V ;W ). Thus, the inequality (13) is trivially true if either δ1 or δ2 are outside of their
specified ranges. The ordering δ1 < δ2 < 2δ1 is related to ensuring that each of double-exponential confidence
rates from the RHS of (13) are positive.
IV. WIRETAP CHANNELS WITH RANDOM STATES NON-CAUSALLY AVAILABLE AT THE ENCODER
We study the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI, for which we establish a new and improved achievability
formula that (in some cases) strictly outperforms the previously best known coding schemes for this scenario. The
secrecy-capacity of a WTC with random states observed non-causally by some or all of the terminals is a highly
challenging problem in information-theoretic security that have received noticeable attention throughout the years
(see, e.g., [4]–[6], [17]). This interest in such secure communication scenarios stems from trying to understand
how to optimally correlate the transmission with the state observation while exploiting the additional randomness
offered by the knowledge of the state sequence to further enhance the secrecy rate. The optimal integration of these
two ingredient is yet to be fully understood.
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S
Fig. 2. The state-dependent wiretap channel with non-casual encoder channel state information.
A. Problem Setup
Let S, X , Y and Z be finite sets. The
(
S,X ,Y,Z,WS ,WY,Z|X,S
)
DMSD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI
is illustrated in Fig. 2. A state sequence s ∈ Sn is generated in and i.i.d. manner according to WS and is revealed
in a non-causal fashion to the sender, who chooses a message m from the set
[
1 : 2nR
]
. The sender then maps
the observed state sequence s and the chosen message m into a sequence x ∈ Xn (the mapping may be random).
The sequence x is transmitted over the DMSD-WTC with transition probability WY,Z|X,W . The output sequences
y ∈ Yn and z ∈ Zn are observed by the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Based on y, the receiver
produces an estimate mˆ of m. The eavesdropper tries to glean whatever it can about the message from z.
Remark 2 (Most General Model) Before rigorously defining the setup and stating the result, we note that the
considered model is the most general instance of a SD-WTC with non-causal CSI known at some or all of the
terminals. The broadest model one may consider is when the SD-WTC WY˜,Z˜|X,S1,S2,S3 is driven by a triple of
correlated state random variables (S1, S2, S3) ∼WS1,S2,S3 , where S1 is known to the transmitter, S2 is known to
the receiver and S3 is available at the eavesdropper’s site. However, setting S = S1, Y = (Y˜, S2), Z = (Z˜, S3) in
SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI and defining the channel’s transition probability as
WY,Z|X,S =W(Y˜,S2),(Z˜,S3)|X,S1 = WS2,S3|S1WY˜,Z˜|X,S1,S2,S3 , (16)
one clearly recovers this (prima facie) general SD-WTC from the model with non-causal encoder CSI only.
Definition 3 (Code) An (n,R)-code cn for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI has a message set Mn ,[
1 : 2nR
]
, a stochastic encoder fn :Mn×S
n → P(Xn) and a decoder φn : Y
n → Mˆn, where Mˆn =Mn∪{e}
and e /∈ Mn.
For any message distribution PM ∈ P(Mn) and any (n,R)-code cn, the induced joint PMF on S
n ×Mn ×
Xn × Yn ×Zn × Mˆn is:
P (cn)(s,m,x,y, z, mˆ) = WnS (s)PM (m)fn(x|m, s)W
n
Y,Z|X,S(y, z|x, s)1
{
mˆ=φn(y)
}. (17)
The performance of cn is evaluated in terms of its rate R, the maximal decoding error probability and the SS-metric.
9Definition 4 (Maximal Error Probability) The maximal error probability of an (n,R)-code cn is
e(cn) = max
m∈Mn
em(cn), (18a)
where
em(cn) =
∑
(s,x)∈Sn×Xn
WnS (s)fn(x|m, s)
∑
(y,z)∈Yn×Zn:
φn(y) 6=m
WnY,Z|X,S(y, z|x, s). (18b)
Definition 5 (Information Leakage and SS Metric) Let cn be an (n,R)-code for the SD-WTC with non-causal
encoder CSI and PM ∈ P(Mn). The information leakage to the eavesdropper under the message distribution
PM ∈ P(Mn) is
ℓ(PM , cn) = Icn(M ;Z), (19)
where the subscript cn denotes that the mutual information term is calculated with respect to the joint PMF of M
and Z induced by cn, i.e., with respect to the marginal P
(cn)
M,Z of (17). The SS metric with respect to cn is
2
ℓSem(cn) = max
PM∈P(Mn)
ℓ(PM , cn). (20)
Remark 3 SS requires that the code cn works well for all message PMFs. This means that the mutual information
term in (20) is maximized over PM when the code cn is known. In other words, although not stated explicitly, PM
may depend on cn.
Definition 6 (Achievability) A number R ∈ R+ is called an achievable SS-rate for the SD-WTC with non-causal
encoder CSI, if for every ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a CR (n,R)-code cn with
e(cn) ≤ ǫ (21a)
ℓSem(cn) ≤ ǫ. (21b)
Remark 4 Our achievability proof shows that ℓSem(cn) vanishes exponentially fast. This is a standard requirement
in the cryptography community, commonly referred to as strong-SS (see, e.g., [11, Section 3.2]).
Definition 7 (SS-Capacity) The SS-capacity CSem of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is the supremum
of the set of achievable SS-rates.
B. Main Result
The main result of this work is a novel lower bound on the SS-capacity of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder
CSI. Our achievability formula is subsequently shown to strictly outperform the best previously known coding
2ℓSem(cn) is actually the mutual-information-security (MIS) metric, which is equivalent to SS by [11]. We use the representation in (20)
rather than the formal definition of SS (see, e.g., [11, Equation (4)]) out of analytical convenience.
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scheme for the considered scenario. It is also shown to be tight for certain instances of the SD-WTC of interest.
To state our main result, let U and V be finite alphabets and for any QU,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X ) define
RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, min


I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S),
I(U, V ;Y )− I(U ;S)− I(V ;Z|U)


, (22)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to the joint distribution WSQU,V,X|SWY,Z|X,S .
Theorem 1 (SD-WTC SS-Capacity Lower Bound) The SS-capacity of the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI
is lower bounded as
CSem ≥ RA , max
QU,V,X|S
RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, (23)
and one may restrict the cardinalities of U and V to |U| ≤ |S||X |+ 5 and |V| ≤ |S|2|X |2 + 5|S||X |+ 3.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section VI-B and is based on a superposition coding scheme for secrecy. The
superposition codebook encodes the entire secret message in its outer layer, meaning that no information is carried
by the inner layer of the code. As explained in the following remark, the coding distribution is chosen so that the
inner layer is better observable by the eavesdropper. This makes the eavesdropper ‘waste’ channel resources on
decoding it, leaving insufficient resources to unveil any information on the secret message. The outer layer of the
code is designed to give a physical layer advantage to the legitimate parties, thus enabling wiretap coding which
is used to protect the confidential message. The transmission is correlated with the observed state sequence by
means of the likelihood encoder [9] and SS is established using the strong SCL (both the superposition version
from Lemma 1 and the heterogeneous SCL from [13, Lemma 1]).
Remark 5 (Properties of Optimizing Distributions) The underlying joint distribution in (22) is such that
(U, V )−X−(Y, Z) forms a Markov chain. However, since in all the mutual information terms from (22) the auxiliary
random variable V appears next to U or conditioned on it, we may replace V with define V˜ = (U, V ) without
changing the region. Therefore, one may restrict the optimization domain to distributions with U −V −X− (Y, Z)
without shrinking CSem.
Remark 6 (Relation to Past Results) Our achievability result recovers the previously best known scheme for the
SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI from [4], [5] as a special case. Furthermore, in Section V-C, an example
where RA is strictly larger than the secrecy-rates achievable in [4], [5] is provided (the sub-optimality of [4], [5]
was already shown in [6], but our example falls outside the framework of [6]). If the state sequence S is also known
at the legitimate receiver (obtained by replacing Y with (Y, S) in the considered SD-WTC), our result is at least
as good as the best known lower bound by Chia and El-Gamal from [6, Theorem 1]. The latter work considered
the case where the encoder learns the channel’s state in a causal manner. Nonetheless, the authors of [6] show
that using their causal scheme even when the CSI is available non-causally to the encoder can strictly outperform
the schemes from [4], [5] when Y = (Y, S). As seen in Section V-A, replacing Y with (Y, S) in RA from (23), the
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auxiliary random variables U and V can be chosen to recover the rate bounds from [6, Theorem 1]. In addition,
since our scheme is tailored for the non-causal CSI scenario, our joint distribution allows correlation between the
auxiliary random variable and the state, while in [6, Theorem 1] they are uncorrelated.
Remark 7 (Tightness for Some Special Cases) Theorem 1 also produces some new secrecy-capacity results. In
particular, in Section V-B we show that RA achieves optimality when the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
observe Y˜ = (Y, S1) and Z˜ = (Z, S2), respectively, drawn according to WS1,S2,Y,Z|X,S = WS1,S2|SWY,Z|X , and
WY,Z|X is such that the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the main channel. Namely, the wiretap channel is
independent of the state and favors the eavesdropper over the legitimate receiver; in addition, noisy observations of
the state sequences are available to the receiver and to the eavesdropper. The example mentioned in Remark 6 that
establishes the sub-optimality of [4], [5] is an instance of such a SD-WTC WS1,S2,Y,Z|X,S . In turn, this means that
the secrecy-capacity of this class of channel cannot be recovered from the inner bounds of [4], [5]. Furthermore,
an explicit coding scheme based on a key-agreement protocol that achieves optimality for this scenario is provided
and its relation to the general scheme that achieves RA is explained.
Another scenario where RA is tight is when the SD-WTC is also semi-deterministic in the sense that Y = g(S,X),
for some function g : S × X → Y . Although the coding schemes from [4], [5] are sufficient to achieve secrecy-
capacity for this case, to the best of our knowledge, this result was not derived before.
Remark 8 (Relations Between the Mutual Information Terms in the Lower Bound) The information mea-
sures in the definition of RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
from (22) are related to one another in the following manner. Replacing
I(V ;Z|U) with I(V ;S|U) in the third term inside the minimum produces the second term, while subtracting
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) from the third term results in the first.
Remark 9 (Cardinality Bounds) The cardinality bounds on the auxiliary random variables U and V in Theorem
1 are established by standard application of the Eggleston-Fenchel-Carathe´odory theorem [18, Theorem 18] twice.
The details are omitted.
C. Alternative Characterization of Achievable Result
It turns out that RA can be restated in an alternative yet equivalent form that provides additional insight of
our results. As before, let U and V be alphabets with cardinalities bounded as stated in Theorem 1, and for any
QU,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X ) define
RAltA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, min
{
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S)
}
, (24)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to the joint distribution WSQU,V,X|SWY,Z|X,S .
Proposition 1 (Alternative Characterization of RA) Setting
RAltA , max
QU,V,X|S :
I(U ;Y )−I(U ;S)≥0
RAltA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, (25)
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it holds that
RAltA = RA. (26)
The proof of Proposition 1 is relegated to Appendix A. It is readily observed that RAlt
A
≤ RA. This is since two
first rate bounds in RA (see (22)) are the same as those defining R
Alt
A
, while the third bound in RA is obtained by
adding the first bound from RAlt
A
and the quantity I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S), which we know is non-negative by (25). For
the proof of the opposite inclusion see Appendix A.
The challenge in showing that RA ≤ R
Alt
A
comes from the observation that in RA the legitimate user may not be
able to reliably decode the (inner) U layer of the superposition codebook by itself. Decoding the U layer in RA is
possible, in general, with the assistance of the (outer) V layer. This is evident from the second and third rate bounds
in RA, from which it is seen that even if an input distribution QU,V,X|S induces I(U ;Y ) < I(U ;S), it still might
result in a positive achievable rate. In contrast, RAlt
A
only allows input distributions with I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S), i.e.,
distributions that make U decodable on its own by the legitimate user. Nonetheless, as the proof in Appendix A shows
that RA = R
Alt
A
, it in particular implies that the optimal input distributions in RA always satisfy I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S).
Recall that the purpose of the inner layer codebook U in the scheme that achieves RA is to make the eavesdropper
‘waste’ resources on decoding it (which, in turn, produces SS). This is done by having I(U ;Z) > I(U ;S), where
I(U ;S) is approximately the rate of the U codebook (that must be at least of that rate, and it is never beneficial
to make it larger as it carries no information of the secret message). In that respect, the optimality of coding
distributions with I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S) in RA means that a U codebook that is directly decodable by the legitimate
user is most beneficial in obscuring the eavesdropper.
Remark 10 (Explicit Achievability for Alternative Rate) An explicit achievability proof of RAlt
A
can be estab-
lished by repeating the proof of Theorem 1 that establishes RA as a lower bound on the SS-capacity (see Section
VI-B), while restricting attention only to input distributions with I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S). This is observed by noting
that when QU,V,X|S induces I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;S), the third rate bound in RA(QU,V,X|S) from (22) becomes inactive
(due to the first rate bound therein). Proposition 1 then shows that no loss of optimality occurs as a consequence
of this restriction on the input distributions.
Remark 11 (Interpretation of Alternative Rate) To get some intuition on the structure of RAlt
A
notice that
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) is the total rate of secrecy resources that are produced by the outer layer of the codebook.
That is, the outer layer can achieve a secure communication rate of I(V ;Y |U) −max
{
I(V ;Z|U), I(V ;S|U)
}
,
and it can produce secret key at a rate of
[
I(V ;S|U)−I(V ;Z|U)
]+
, where [x]+ = max(0, x), because some of the
dummy bits needed to correlate the transmission with the state are secure for the same reason that a transmission
is secure.
Also, the total amount of reliable (secured and unsecured) communication that this codebook allows is
I(U, V ;Y ) − I(U, V ;S), including both the inner and outer layer. Therefore, one interpretation of our encoding
scheme is that secret key produced in the outer layer (if any) is applied to the non-secure communication in
the inner layer. In total, this achieves a secure communication rate that is the minimum of the total secrecy
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resources I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) (i.e. secure communication and secret key) and the total communication rate
I(U, V ;Y ) − I(U, V ;S), corresponding to the statement of RAlt
A
. Of course, this effect happens naturally by the
design of the superposition code, without the need to explicitly extract a key and apply a one-time pad.
V. SPECIAL CASES AND EXAMPLES
A. Comparison to the Encoder and Decoder CSI Case
Consider the case when the state sequence S is also available to the legitimate receiver, i.e., when Y is replaced
with (Y, S). The scenario when the encoder CSI is causal was studies by Chia and El-Gamal in [6], where a lower
bound on the weak-secrecy capacity CEnc−Dec−CSI
Weak
was established. To restate their result, let T be a finite set and
for any PT ∈ P(T ) and PX|T,S : S × T → P(X ) define
RCEG
(
PTPX|T,S
)
, min
{
I(T ;Y |S), H(S|T, Z) +
[
I(T ;Y, S)− I(T ;Z)
]+}
, (27a)
where [x]+ = max(0, x) and the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to WSPTPX|T,SWY,Z|X,S .
Theorem 1 in [6] states that
CEnc−Dec−CSI
Weak
≥ REnc−Dec−CSICEG , maxPTPX|T,S
RCEG
(
PTPX|T,S
)
. (27b)
The independence between T and S is an outcome of the causality restriction on encoder CSI.
In effect, the result of [6, Theorem 1] was not expressed as in (27). Rather, the authors derived two separate
lower bounds on CEnc−Dec−CSIWeak and stated their achievability result as the maximum between the two. Be it as it
may, it is readily verified that (27) is an equivalent representation of [6, Theorem 1]. Furthermore, [6, Remark 3.1]
effectively asserts that whenever I(T ;Y, S) ≥ I(T ;Z), allowing correlation between T and S does not result in
higher secrecy-rates. However, no such claim was established when the inequality is reversed.
Although studying the causal model, the authors of [6] showed that their result is at least as good as the best
previously known scheme for the non-causal encoder CSI scenario. The latter scheme is obtained from [4, Theorem
2] - an achievable weak-secrecy rate for the SC-WTC with non-causal CSI at the encoder only - by replacing Y
with (Y, S) (see Remark 2). All the more so, an example was provided in [6] where it is shown that in some
cases REnc−Dec−CSICEG achieves strictly higher rates than [4, Theorem 2] (see also [5]). As stated in the following
proposition, our achievable formula RA is at least as good as RCEG, when the legitimate receiver also has access
to S.
To formulate the relation between the result of Theorem 1 and [6, Theorem 1], we use RAlt
A
- the alternative
representation of RA presented in Section IV-C. Note that when the legitimate receiver also observes the state
sequence, the constraint on the optimization domain in RAlt
A
(see (1)) degenerates. This happens because replacing
Y with (Y, S) in (1) the constraint on the input distributions becomes I(U ;Y |S) ≥ 0, which always holds.
Consequently, RAlt
A
reduces to
REnc−Dec−CSI
Alt
= max
QU,V,X|S
REnc−Dec−CSI
Alt
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, (28a)
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where for any QU,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X )
REnc−Dec−CSI
Alt
(
QU,V,X|S
)
= min
{
I(V ;Y, S|U)− I(V ;Z|U), I(U, V ;Y, S)− I(U, V ;S)
}
, (28b)
and the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to the same PMF as in Theorem 1.
Proposition 2 The following relation holds:
REnc−Dec−CSI
CEG
≤ max
PT,X|S
REnc−Dec−CSI
CEG
(
PT,X|S
)
≤ REnc−Dec−CSI
Alt
. (29)
The proof Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B. The proof shows that REnc−Dec−CSI
Alt
recovers REnc−Dec−CSI
CEG
by
either setting U = T and V = S or setting U = 0 and V = (T, S) (the choice of the auxiliaries varies depending
on whether I(T ;Y, S) ≤ I(T ;Z) or not).
A few remarks are at hand regarding the result of Proposition 2:
1) As seen in (29), our formula reduces to a maximization of REnc−Dec−CSI
CEG
(
PT,X|S
)
over a domain of
distribution that allow correlation between T and S. This is since our coding scheme was tailored for the
non-causal CSI scenario, in contrast to the causal construction from [6] that results in restricting T and S
to be independent. Although, this correlation is unnecessary when I(T ;Y, S) ≥ I(T ;Z), it may be the case
that a correlated T and S are better when I(T ;Y, S) < I(T ;Z).
2) The coding scheme in [6] that achieves REnc−Dec−CSI
CEG
uses the state sequence to explicitly generate a key (of
the largest rate possible while still keeping the eavesdropper ignorant of it). This key is then used to one-time-
pad a part of the confidential message; the other part of the message is protected via a wiretap code (whenever
wiretap coding is possible). In contrast, our coding scheme for achieving RA (or R
Alt
A
, which uses the same
encoding - see Remark 10), does not involve any explicit key generation (nor key agreement) phase. Instead,
our code is based on a superposition codebook that fully encodes the confidential message in its outer layer,
and SS is ensured by making the eavesdropper ‘waste’ channel resources on the inner layer codeword that
carries no confidential information whatsoever. Nonetheless, the relation between our scheme (when adjusted
to the encoder-decoder CSI scenario) and the one-time-pad-based scheme from [6] is observed as follows.
As mentioned before, in recovering REnc−Dec−CSI
CEG
from REnc−Dec−CSI
A
we include the state random variable
S as part as the auxiliary random variable V . Doing so essentially uses the state sequence to randomize the
choice of the transmitted codeword for a prescribed confidential message m. Since S is also known to the
decoder, it can reverse this randomized choice and backtrack to the transmitted message. The eavesdropper,
being ignorant of the state sequence, cannot do the same. This is an alternative perspective of the one-time-
pad operation: randomly choosing a codeword from a cluster of codewords associated with each confidential
message. Making these clusters large enough (so that they overlap), allows only a party that has access to the
randomness used for the randomized choice to isolate the original message. This phenomenon was discussed
quantitatively in Remark 11.
3) Our coding scheme produces SS and a vanishing maximal error probability, while achieving rates that are at
least as high as [6], where only weak-secrecy and a vanishing average error probability were guaranteed. Thus,
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an upgrade of both performance metrics from [6] is possible, without inflicting any rate loss. Furthermore,
our scheme is based on a single transmission block, while [6, Theorem 1] relies on transmitting multiple
blocks. The multiple-block transmission is an artifact of the key-generation scheme used therein (and its
analysis), rather than being a consequence of the causal CSI assumption. The generated cryptographic key
is to be (asymptotically) independent of the transmission; otherwise, leaked information about the key might
compromise security. To guarantee such independence, the key used in each block is extracted from the
state sequence in the previous block. It seems that an adaptation of the scheme from [6] to a single block
transmission is possible through random binning output statistics approximation arguments based on [19].
B. Tight SS-Capacity Results
The result of Theorem 1 is tight for several special cases that are discussed in this section.
1) Less Noisy SD-WTC with Non-Causal Encoder and Decoder CSI: As shown in Section V-A, our result is at
least as good as the achievable rates from [6, Theorem 1], for the case when the legitimate decoder also observes
the state sequence. Therefore, RA achieves the secrecy-capacity of all the scenarios for which Theorem 1 from [6]
is tight. In particular, this includes a class of less noisy SD-WTC WY,Z|X,S satisfying I(U ;Y |S) ≥ I(U ;Z|S) for
every random variable U for which (U, S) − (X,S) − (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain. The weak-secrecy-capacity
(under a vanishing average error probability criterion) of this setting is given by [6, Theorem 3]
CEnc−Dec−CSI
LN
= max
PX|S
min
{
I(X ;Y |S), I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)
}
, (30)
and is recovered from REnc−Dec−CSI
CEG
given in (28) by setting T = X . For the special case when the WTC is
independent of the state, i.e., when WY,Z|X,S = WY,Z|X , C
Enc−Dec−CSI
LN
specializes to the secrecy-capacity for
the WTC with a key of rate H(S) [20]. Since REnc−Dec−CSI
A
recovers [6, Theorem 1] while ensuring SS and
a vanishing maximal error probability, our result serves as a strengthening of those from [6] to these upgraded
performance criteria.
The example the authors of [6] used to show that their scheme may result in strictly higher secrecy rates than
the best previously known schemes from the literature [4], [5] considered the opposite case. More precisely, they
considered a WTC WY,Z|X,S =WY,Z|X that is independent of the state but where the eavesdropper’s observation
is better than this of the legitimate user, i.e., X −Z − Y forms a Markov chain. Although the example established
the superiority of their result over those from [4], [5], the secrecy-capacity of this instance was not established.
In the following subsection we show that Theorem 1 is tight for a generalized version of this reversely less noisy
SD-WTC.
2) Reversely Less Noisy SD-WTC with Full Encoder and Noisy Decoder and Eavesdropper CSI: Let S1 and S2
be finite sets and consider a SD-WTCWY˜,Z˜|X,S with non-causal encoder CSI, where Y˜ = (Y, S1), Z˜ = (Z, S2) and
WS1,S2,Y,Z|X,S = WS1,S2|SWY,Z|X . Namely, the transition probability WS1,S2,Y,Z|X,S decomposes into a product
of two WTCs, one being independent of the state, while the other one depends only on it. The legitimate receiver
(respectively, the eavesdropper) observes not only the output Y (respectively, Z) of the WTC WnY,Z|X , but also
S1 (respectively, S2) - a noisy version of the state sequence drawn according to the marginal of W
n
S1,S2|S
. We
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characterize the SS-capacity of this setting when the WTC WY,Z|X is reversely less noisy, i.e., when I(U ;Y ) ≤
I(U ;Z), for every random variable U with U −X− (Y, Z). After the submission of this paper, the authors became
aware of an independent derivation of this result under an average error probability and the weak-secrecy metric
[21].
In Section V-C we show that this secrecy-capacity result cannot be achieved from the previously known achievable
schemes from [4]–[6]. For [6], this conviction is straightforward since the considered setting falls outside the
framework of a SD-WTC with full (non-causal) encoder and decoder CSI. The sub-optimality of [4], [5] is illustrated
in Section V-C via an explicit example of a reversely less noisy SD-WTC, for which our scheme achieves strictly
higher secrecy rates.
To state the SS-capacity result let A and B be finite sets and for any PX ∈ P(X ), PA|S : S → P(A) and
PB|A : A → P(B) define
RRLN
(
PX , PA|S , PB|A
)
= min
{
I(A;S1|B)− I(A;S2|B), I(X ;Y )− I(A;S|S1)
}
, (31)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to the joint PMFWSPA|SPB|APXWS1,S2|SWY,Z|X ,
i.e., where (X,Y, Z) is independent of (S, S1, S2, A,B) and A−S−(S1, S2) and B−A−(S, S1, S2) form Markov
chains (as well as the Markov relations implied by the channels).
Corollary 1 (Reversely Less Noisy SD-WTC SS-Capacity) The SS-capacity of the reversely less noisy WTC with
full encoder and noisy decoder and eavesdropper CSI is
CRLN = max
PX ,PA|S ,PB|A
RRLN
(
PX , PA|S , PB|A
)
. (32)
A proof of Corollary 1, where the direct part is established based on Theorem 1, is given in Appendix C. Instead,
one can derive an explicit achievability for (32) via a coding scheme based on a key agreement protocol via multiple
blocks and a one-time-pad operation. To gain some intuition, an outline of the scheme for the simplified case where
S2 = 0 is described in the following remark. This scenario is fitting for intuitive purposes since the absence of
correlated observations with S at the eavesdropper’s site allows to design an explicit secured protocol over a single
transmission block. We note however, the event when S2 is not a constant, a single-block-based coding scheme is
feasible via the superposition code construction in the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 12 (Explicit Achievability for Corollary 1) It is readily verified that when S2 = 0, setting B = 0 into
(32) is optimal. The resulting secrecy rate R˜RLN
(
PX , PA|S
)
, min
{
I(A;S1), I(X ;Y ) − I(A;S|S1)
}
, for any
fixed PX and PA|S as before, is achieved as follows:
1) Generate 2nRA a-codewords as i.i.d. samples of PnA .
2) Partition the set of all a-codewords into 2nRBin equal sized bins. Accordingly, label each a-codeword as
a(b, k), where b ∈
[
1 : 2nRBin
]
and k ∈
[
1 : 2n(RA−RBin)
]
.
3) Generate a point-to-point codebook that comprises 2n(R+RBin) codewords x(m, b), where m ∈ Mn and
b ∈
[
1 : 2nRBin
]
, drawn according to PnX .
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4) Upon observing the state sequence s ∈ Sn, the encoder searches the entire a-codebook for an a-codeword
that is jointly-typical with s, with respect to their joint PMF WSPA|S . Such a codeword is found with high
probability provided that
RA > I(A;S). (33)
Let (b, k) ∈
[
1 : 2nRBin
]
×
[
1 : 2n(RA−RBin)
]
be the indices of the selected a-codeword. To sent the message
m ∈ Mn, the encoder one-time-pads m with k to get m˜ = m ⊕ k ∈ Mn, and transmits x(m˜, b) over the
WTC. The one-time-pad operation restricts the rates to satisfy
R ≤ RA −RBin. (34)
5) The legitimate receiver first decodes the x-codeword using it’s channel observation y. An error-free decoding
requires the total number of x-codewords to be less than the capacity of the sub-channel WY |X , i.e.,
R+RBin < I(X ;Y ). (35)
Denoting the decoded indices by ( ˆ˜m, bˆ) ∈ Mn×
[
1 : 2nRBin
]
, the decoder then uses the noisy state observation
s1 ∈ S
n
1 to isolate the exact a-codeword from the bˆ-th bin. Namely, it searches for a unique index kˆ ∈[
1 : 2n(RA−RBin)
]
, such that
(
a(bˆ, kˆ), s1
)
are jointly-typical with respect to the PMF PA,S1 the marginal of
WSWS1|SPA|S . The probability of error in doing so is arbitrarily small with the blocklength provided that
RA −RBin < I(A;S1). (36)
Having decoded ( ˆ˜m, bˆ) and kˆ, the decoder declares mˆ , ˆ˜m⊕ kˆ as the decoded message.
6) For the eavesdropper, note that although the it has the correct (m˜, b) (due to the less noisy condition), it
cannot decode k since it has no observation that is correlated with the A, S and S1 random variables.
Security of the protocol is implies by the security of the one-time-pad operation.
7) Putting the aforementioned rate bounds together establishes the achievability of R˜RLN
(
PX , PA|S
)
.
To the best of our knowledge, the result of Corollary 1 was not established before. It is, however, strongly related
to [22], where a similar model was considered for the purpose of key generation (rather than the transmission of
a confidential message). In particular, [22] established lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity of the
reversely less noisy WTC with noisy decoder and eavesdropper CSI. The code construction proposed in [22] is
reminiscent of this described in Remark 12 (with the proper adjustments for the key-agreement task).
Remark 13 We refer back to the example from [6] used to demonstrate the superiority of their result over previous
non-causal schemes [4], [5]. The WTC considered in the example is independent of the state with Z = X that is
further fed into a binary symmetric channel (BSC) to produce the output Y . Corollary 1 captures this instance as
a special case by taking S1 = S, S2 = 0 and setting WY,Z|X as mentioned. This characterizes the SS-capacity as
R˜Enc−Dec−CSI
RLN
= max
PX
min
{
H(S), I(X ;Y )
}
. (37)
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In essence, the example from [6] showed that while their proposed scheme is able to operate at the rate from (37),
the schemes from [4], [5] are unable to do the same. The optimality of (37) was not established in [6].
3) Semi-Deterministic SD-WTC with Non-Causal Encoder CSI: Another observation is that RA from Theorem
1 is tight when the main channel is deterministic, i.e., when WY,Z|X,S = 1{Y=g(X,S)}WZ|X,S , for some function
g : S×X → Y . In fact, the achievability results from [4], [5] are sufficient for achieving optimality in this case. We
state this secrecy-capacity result merely because, to the best of our knowledge, it was not explicitly stated before.
Corollary 2 (Semi-Deterministic SD-WTC with Non-Causal Encoder CSI - SS-Capacity) The SS-capacity of
the semi-deterministic SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI is
CSemi−Det = max
PX|S
min
{
H(Y |Z), H(Y |S)
}
, (38)
where the entropy terms are calculated with respect to WSPX|S1{Y=g(X,S)}WZ|X,S .
The achievability of CSemi−Det follows by setting U = 0 and V = Y (which is a valid choice due to the deterministic
nature of the main channel) in Theorem 1. The converse is also easily established by standard techniques - see
Appendix D.
Note that the SS-capacity is unaffected by whether the eavesdropper’s channel is deterministic or not. Letting
Z = h(X,S), for some h : S × X → Z does not changes the result of Corollary 2.
C. Comparison to Previous Schemes for the SD-WTC with Non-Causal Encoder CSI
The result of Theorem 1 recovers the previously best known achievable formula for the SD-WTC with non-
causal encoder CSI by Chen and Han Vinck from [4, Theorem 2]. Moreover, we show that for some SD-WTC our
achievability is strictly better than [4, Theorem 2]. The latter result states that the weak-secrecy capacity of the
considered SD-WTC is lower bounded by
REnc−CSI
CHV
, max
PV,X|S
REnc−CSI
CHV
(
PV,X|S
)
, (39a)
where for any PV,X|S : S → P(V × X ),
REnc−CSI
CHV
(
PV,X|S
)
, min
{
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z), I(V ;Y )− I(V ;S),
}
, (39b)
and the mutual information terms are taken with respect to WSPV,X|SWY,Z|X,S , i.e., V − (X,S)− (Y, Z) forms
a Markov Chain. This result was generalized in [5, Theorem 1] to the case where the SD-WTC is governed by
a pair of pairwise i.i.d. state sequences (S,S1) with distribution W
n
S,S1
(i.e., the SD-WTC’s transition matrix is
WY˜,Z|X,S,S1), the encoder is assumed to have non-causal access to S, while the legitimate receiver has S1. However,
as explained in Remark 2, this instance is a special case of the channel from [4] obtained by taking Y = (Y˜, S1)
and setting WY,Z|X,S = W(Y˜,S1),Z|X,S = WS1|SWY˜,Z|X,S,S1 . For this reason, we henceforth focus on [4] for the
comparison.
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Fig. 3. A reversely less noisy SD-WTC with a BSC(α), α ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
, connecting X and Y , and a BEC(σ), σ ∈ (0, 1) connection S and S1.
The state random variable S has entropy H(S) = 1− h(α).
First note that Theorem 1 recovers REnc−CSI
CHV
by setting U = 0 in RA. Consequently,
RA ≥ R
Enc−CSI
CHV
. (40)
On top of this observation, the following example shows that there exist SD-WTCs for which the inequality in (40)
is strict. The example is an instance of a reversely less noisy SD-WTC from Section V-B2, where the legitimate
receiver observes a noisy version of the state sequence. The eavesdropper, however, receives no output from the
channel WS1,S2|S , a fact modeled by setting S2 = 0. Our example falls outside of the framework of [6], where the
legitimate users share the same CSI.
Example: Let S = X = Y = Z = {0, 1}, S1 = {0, 1, ?}, where ? /∈ {0, 1} and S2 = {0}. Consider the
reversely less noisy SD-WTC WS1,S2|SWY,Z|X from Section V-B2 defined by two parameters α ∈
(
0, 12
)
and
σ ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
• S ∼ Ber(pα), where pα = h
−1
(
1 − h(α)
)
∈
(
0, 12
)
, h is the binary entropy function and h−1 is the inverse
of the restriction of h to
[
0, 12
]
.
• S2 = 0 with probability 1 (i.e., a degenerate random variable). Thus, the channel WS1,S2|S produces no
information-carrying output at the eavesdropper’s site.
• Z = X , i.e., the eavesdropper noiselessly observes the transmitted symbol X .
• WY |X is a BSC with crossover probability α ∈
(
0, 12
)
(abbreviated as a BSC(α)).
• WS1|S is a binary erasure channel with erasure probability σ ∈ (0, 1) (abbreviated as a BEC(σ)).
The considered SD-WTC is depicted in Fig. 3 and its SS-capacity is denoted by CRLN(α, σ). Since S2 = 0, by
Remark 12 we have that
CRLN(α, σ) = max
PX ,PA|S
min
{
I(A;S1), I(X ;Y )− I(A;S|S1)
}
. (41)
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Proposition 3 For any α ∈
(
0, 12
)
and σ ∈ (0, 1), the SS-capacity of the reversely less noisy SD-WTC described
above is
CRLN(α, σ) = σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
, (42)
where σ¯ = 1− σ.
Proof: For the direct part fix α ∈
(
0, 12
)
and σ ∈ (0, 1), let X ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
and set A = S. Let Eσ ∼ Ber(σ) be
a random variable independent of S that defines when S1 =?, i.e.,
S1 =


S, Eσ = 0
?, Eσ = 1
. (43)
Since Eσ is determined by S1 and is independent of S, we have
I(S;S1) = I(S;S1, Eσ) = I(S;S1|Eσ) = σ¯I(S;S|Eσ = 0) + σI(S; ?|Eσ = 1) = σ¯H(S) = σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
. (44)
By similar steps we also obtain
I(A;S|S1) = I(S;S|S1, Eσ) = σ¯H(S|S,Eσ = 0) + σH(S|?, Eσ = 1) = σ
[
1− h(α)
]
. (45)
Inserting (44)-(45) along with I(X ;Y ) = 1− h(α) into (42), gives
CRLN(α, σ) ≥ σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
. (46)
The converse is straightforward as for any α ∈
(
0, 12
)
and σ ∈ (0, 1), we have
CRLN(α, σ) = max
PX ,PA|S
min
{
I(A;S1), I(X ;Y )− I(A;S|S1)
}
≤ max
PA|S
I(A;S1)
(a)
= max
PA|S
σ¯I(A;S)
≤ σ¯H(S)
= σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
, (47)
where (a) follows by similar step as (44), while using the independence of A and Eσ (which itself is a consequence
of S and Eσ being independent and A− S − (S1, Eσ) forming a Markov chain).
Having a simple expression for CRLN(α, σ), we now move on to show that the SS-capacity cannot be achieved
by REnc−CSI
CHV
from (39). This will provide an explicit example outside the framework of [6] (where the state was
known both at the transmitting and receiving) where the result from [4] is sub-optimal. For the considered SD-WTC,
(39b) becomes
REnc−CSI
CHV
(
PV,X|S
)
, min
{
I(V ;Y, S1)− I(V ;X), I(V ;Y, S1)− I(V ;S)
}
, (48)
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and the corresponding joint distribution is WSPV,X|SWS1|SWY |X . Assume by contradiction that R
Enc−CSI
CHV
≥
σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
and consider the two following cases:
Case 1: For any PV,X|S : S → P(V ×X ) with I(V ;Y ) ≤ I(V ;S), we start by upper bounding the second term
in the minimum from the RHS of (48) as
I(V ;Y, S1)− I(V ;S)
(a)
= I(V ;Y |S1)− I(V ;S|S1)
(b)
= σ¯
[
I(V ;Y |S)− I(V ;S|S)
]
+ σ
[
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;S)
]
(c)
≤ σ¯I(V ;Y |S)
(d)
≤ σ¯I(V, S;Y )
(e)
≤ σ¯I(X ;Y )
(f)
= σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
(49)
where:
(a) is because V − S − S1 forms a Markov chain;
(b) follows by similar steps as in (44), while using the independence of Eσ and (V, S,X, Y );
(c) uses the assumption in Case 1 that I(V ;Y ) ≤ I(V ;S);
(d) adds the quantity σ¯I(S;Y );
(e) uses the Markov chain (V, S)−X − Y ;
(f) follows because I(X ;Y ) is upper bounded by the capacity of the BSC(α).
Thus, to satisfy REnc−CSI
CHV
≥ σ¯
[
1 − h(α)
]
, it must be true that I(V ;Y, S1) − I(V ;S) = σ¯
[
1 − h(α)
]
, for any
PV,X|S with I(V ;Y ) ≤ I(V ;S). An end-to-end equality must, therefore, hold in the chain of inequalities from
(49). In particular, we have
• (d) holds with equality if and only if S and Y are independent.
• (e) holds with equality if and only if I(X ;Y |V, S) = 0, which is equivalent to X − (V, S) − Y forming a
Markov chain.
• (f) holds with equality if and only if X ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
.
The following lemma specifies some properties that are implied by the above relations. The proof of Lemma 2
is proven in Appendix E
Lemma 2 The following implications hold:
1) S and Y are independent =⇒ S and X are independent.
2) X − (V, S)− Y and (V, S)−X − Y form Markov chains =⇒ ∃ g : V × S → X such that X = f(V, S).
Based on Lemma 2, we upper bound the first expression in the minimum from the RHS of (48) as follows:
I(V ;Y, S1)− I(V ;X) = I(V ;Y, S1)− I(V ;S) + I(V ;S)− I(V ;X)
(a)
= σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
+ I(V ;S)− I(V ;X)
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= σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
+ I(V ;S|X)− I(V ;X |S)
(b)
≤ σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
+H(S)− I(V ;X |S)
(c)
= σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
+H(S)−H(X)
(d)
= σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
+ 1− h(α)− 1
< σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
(50)
where:
(a) follows by the end-to-end equality in (49);
(b) uses the independence of S and X and the non-negativity of entropy;
(c) again relies on X and S being independent and on X = f(V, S);
(d) is because H(S) = 1− h(α) and X ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
.
The strict inequality in (50) is in contradiction to REnc−CSI
CHV
≥ CRLN(α, σ) since α ∈
(
0, 12
)
, which means that
h(α) > 0.
Case 2: For any PV,X|S : S → P(V × X ) with I(V ;Y ) > I(V ;S), consider the following upper bound on the
first term in the minimum from the RHS of (48). We have
I(V ;Y, S1)− I(V ;X)
(a)
= I(V ;S1|Y )− I(V ;X |Y )
(b)
≤ I(V ;S1|Y )
(c)
≤ I(V, Y ;S1)
(d)
≤ I(S;S1)
(e)
= σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
(51)
where:
(a) is because V −X − Y forms a Markov chain;
(b) is due to the non-negativity of mutual information;
(c) adds the quantity I(Y ;S1);
(d) uses the Markov chain (V, Y )− S − S1;
(e) follows by (44).
As before, since REnc−CSI
CHV
≥ σ¯
[
1− h(α)
]
and (51) both hold, it must be the case that I(V ;Y, S1)− I(V ;X) =
σ¯
[
1−h(α)
]
, for any PV,X|S with I(V ;Y ) > I(V ;S). An end-to-end equality in (49) is equivalent to the following:
• (b) holds with equality if and only if I(V ;X |Y ) = 0, which is equivalent to the Markov chain X − V − Y .
• (c) holds with equality if and only if S1 and Y are independent.
• (d) holds with equality if and only if I(S;S1|V, Y ) = 0, which is equivalent to S − (V, Y ) − S1 forming a
Markov chain.
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Lemma 3 (proven in Appendix F) gives additional properties that are implied by the above relations.
Lemma 3 The following implications hold:
1) X − V − Y and V −X − Y form Markov chains =⇒ ∃ g1 : V → X such that X = g1(V ).
2) S1 and Y are independent =⇒ S and Y are independent.
3) S − (V, Y )− S1 and (V, Y )− S− S1 form Markov chains =⇒ ∃ g2 : V ×Y → S such that S = g2(V, Y ).
Using properties from Lemma 3, we upper bound I(V ;Y ) as
I(V ;Y ) = H(V )−H(V |Y )
(a)
= H(V )−H(V, S|Y )
= I(V ;S, Y )−H(S|Y )
(b)
= I(V ;S) + I(V ;Y |S)−H(S)
(c)
= I(V ;S) + I(V, S;Y )−H(S)
(d)
≤ I(V ;S) + I(X ;Y )−H(S)
(e)
≤ I(V ;S) (52)
where:
(a) is because S = g2(V, Y );
(b) and (c) use the independence of S and Y ;
(d) follows because (V, S)−X − Y forms a Markov chain;
(e) is since I(X ;Y ) ≤ 1− h(α), while H(S) = 1− h(α).
The inequality in (52) is in contradiction to PV,X|S in Case 2 being such that I(V ;Y ) > I(V ;S). The
contradictions in both cases imply that REnc−CSI
CHV
< σ¯
[
1 − h(α)
]
, i.e., that REnc−CSI
CHV
is sub-optimal for the
considered example.
VI. PROOFS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We state the proof in terms of arbitrary distributions (not necessarily discrete). When needed, we will specialize
to the case that V and W are finite. For any fixed superposition codebook Bn, let the Radon-Nikodym derivative
between the induced and desired distributions be denoted as
∆Bn(w) ,
dP
(Bn)
W
dQnW
(w). (53)
In the discrete case, this is just a ratio of probability mass functions. Accordingly, the relative entropy of interest,
which is a function of the codebook Bn, is given by
D
(
P
(Bn)
W
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnW) = ∫ dP (Bn)W log∆Bn . (54)
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To describe the jointly-typical set over u-, v- and w-sequences, we first define information density iQW |U :
U ×W → R+ and iQW |U,V : U × V ×W → R+ as
iQU,W (u,w) := log
(
dQW |U=u
dQW
(w)
)
, (55a)
iQU,V,W (u, v, w) := log
(
dQW |U=u,V=v
dQW
(w)
)
. (55b)
In (55), the arguments of the logarithms are the Radon-Nikodym derivatives between QW |U=u and QW and
QW |U=u,V=v and QW , respectively. Let ǫ1, ǫ2 ≥ 0 be arbitrary, to be determined later, and define
Aǫ1,ǫ2 ,

(u,v,w) ∈ U
n × Vn ×Wn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n iQnU,W (u,w) < I(U ;W ) + ǫ1
1
n iQnU,V,W (u,v,w) < I(U, V ;W ) + ǫ2

 , (56)
and note that
iQn
U,W
(u,w) =
n∑
t=1
iQU,W (ut, wt), (57a)
iQn
U,V,W
(u,v,w) =
n∑
t=1
iQU,V,W (ut, vt, wt), (57b)
We split P
(Bn)
W into two parts, making use of the indicator function. For every w ∈ W
n, define
PBn,1(v) := 2
−n(R1+R2)
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
QnW |U,V
(
w
∣∣u(i),v(i, j,m))1{(
u(i),v(i,j,m),w
)
∈Aǫ1,ǫ2
}, (58a)
PBn,2(v) := 2
−n(R1+R2)
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
QnW |U,V
(
w
∣∣u(i),v(i, j,m))1{(
u(i),v(i,j,m),w
)
/∈Aǫ1 ,ǫ2
}. (58b)
The measures PBn,1 and PBn,2 on the spaceW
n are not probability measures, but PBn,1+PBn,2 = P
(Bn)
W for each
codebook B. We also split ∆Bn into two parts. Namely, for every w ∈ W
n, we set
∆Bn,j(w) :=
dPBn,j
dQnW
(w), j = 1, 2. (59)
With respect to the above definitions, Lemma 4 states an upper bound on the relative entropy of interest.
Lemma 4 For every fixed superposition codebook Bn, we have
D
(
P
(Bn)
W
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnW) ≤ h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
+
∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1 +
∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2, (60)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function.
The proof of the lemma is omitted as it follows the same steps as in the proof of [12, Lemma 2] (see Appendix
A therein for details). Based on Lemma 4, if the relative entropy of interest does not decay exponentially fast,
then the same is true for the terms on the right-hand side (RHS) of (60). Therefore, to establish Lemma 1, its
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suffices to show that the probability (with respect to a random superposition codebook) of the RHS not vanishing
exponentially fast to 0 as n→∞, is double-exponentially small.
Notice that PBn,1 usually contains almost all of the probability. That is, for any fixed Bn, we have∫
dPBn,2 = 1−
∫
dPBn,1
=
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
2−n(R1+R2)PQn
W |U,V
((
u(i),v(i, j,m),W
)
/∈ Aǫ1,ǫ2
∣∣∣U = u(i),V = v(i, j,m)). (61)
For a random codebook, (61) becomes∫
dPBn,2
=
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
2−n(R1+R2)PQn
W |U,V
((
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV ),W
)
/∈ Aǫ1,ǫ2
∣∣∣U = V(i,BU ),V = V(i, j,BV )),
(62)
where the RHS is an average of exponentially many i.i.d. random variables bounded between 0 and 1. Furthermore,
the expected value of each one is the exponentially small probability of correlated sequences being atypical:
EBnPQnW |U,V
((
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV ),W
)
/∈ Aǫ1,ǫ2
∣∣∣U = U(i,BU ),V = V(i, j,BV ))
= PQn
U,V,W
((
U,V,W
)
/∈ Aǫ1,ǫ2
)
= PQn
U,V,W
({
n∑
t=1
iQU,W (Ut,Wt) ≥ n
(
I(U ;W ) + ǫ1
)}
∪
{
n∑
t=1
iQU,V,W (Ut, Vt,Wt) ≥ n
(
I(U, V ;W ) + ǫ2
)})
≤ PQn
U,V,W
(
2λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,W (Ut,Wt)≥ 2nλ(I(U ;W )+ǫ1)
)
+PQn
U,V,W
(
2λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,V,W (Ut,Vt,Wt)≥ 2nλ(I(U,V ;W )+ǫ2)
)
,
(63)
where the last inequality uses the union bound and is true for any λ ≥ 0. We further bound the two probability
terms from the RHS of (63)by exponentially decaying functions of n as follows. For the first term consider:
PQn
U,V,W
(
2λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,W (Ut,Wt) ≥ 2nλ(I(U ;W )+ǫ1)
) (a)
≤
EQn
U,W
2λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,W (Ut,Wt)
2nλ(I(U ;W )+ǫ1)
=
(
EQU,W 2
λiQU,W (U,W )
2λ(I(U ;W )+ǫ1)
)n
(b)
= 2
nλ
(
1
λ
log2 EQU,W
[
2
λiQU,W
(U;W )
]
−I(U ;W )−ǫ1
)
(c)
= 2nλ
(
dλ+1(QU,W ,QUQW )−I(U ;W )−ǫ1
)
, (64)
where (a) is Markov’s inequality, (b) follows by restricting λ to be strictly positive, while (c) is from the definition
of the Re´nyi divergence of order λ+1. We use units of bits for mutual information and Re´nyi divergence to coincide
with the base two expression of rate. Similarly, the second term from the RHS of (63) is upper bounded by
PQn
U,V,W
(
2λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,V,W (Ut,Vt,Wt) ≥ 2nλ(I(U,V ;W )+ǫ2)
)
≤ 2nλ
(
dλ+1(QU,V,W ,QU,VQW )−I(U,V ;W )−ǫ2
)
. (65)
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Now, substituting α = λ+ 1 into (64)-(65) gives
EBnPQnW |U,V
((
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV ),W
)
/∈ Aǫ1,ǫ2
∣∣∣U = U(i,BU ),V = V(i, j,BV )) ≤ 2−nβ(1)α,ǫ1 + 2−nβ(2)α,ǫ2 ,
(66)
where
β(1)α,ǫ1 = (α− 1)
(
I(U ;W ) + ǫ1 − dα(QU,W , QUQW )
)
, (67a)
β(2)α,ǫ2 = (α− 1)
(
I(U, V ;W ) + ǫ2 − dα(QU,V,W , QU,VQW )
)
, (67b)
for every α > 1 and ǫ1, ǫ2 ≥ 0, over which we may optimize. The optimal choices of ǫ1 and ǫ2 are apparent when
all bounds of the proof are considered together (some yet to be derived), but the formula may seem arbitrary at the
moment. Nevertheless, fix δ1 ∈
(
0, R1 − I(U ;W )
)
and δ2 ∈
(
0, R1 +R2 − I(U, V ;W )
)
, as found in the theorem
statement, and for any α > 1 set
ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
=
1
2 (R1 − δ1) + (α − 1)dα(QU,W , QUQW )
1
2 + (α− 1)
− I(U ;W ), (68a)
ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
=
1
2 (R1 + R2 − δ2) + (α− 1)dα(QU,V,W , QU,VQW )
1
2 + (α− 1)
− I(U, V ;W ). (68b)
Substituting into β
(1)
α,ǫ1 and β
(2)
α,ǫ2 gives
β
(1)
α,δ1
, β
(1)
α,ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
=
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R1 − δ1 − dα(QU,W , QUQW )
)
, (69a)
β
(1)
α,δ2
, β
(2)
α,ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
=
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R1 +R2 − δ2 − dα(QU,V,W , QU,VQW )
)
. (69b)
Observe that ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
and ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
in (68) are nonnegative. For example, ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
≥ 0 due to the assumption that R1− δ1 >
I(U ;W ), because α > 1 and dα(QU,W , QWQV ) ≥ d1(QW,V , QUQW ) = I(U ;W ).
Furthermore, the properties of Re´nyi divergence imply the existence of an α > 1, for which (69a) and (69b) are
strictly positive.
Lemma 5 (Strictly Positive Exponents) There exists an α > 1 such that β
(j)
α,δj
> 0, for j = 1, 2.
Lemma 5 is proven in Appendix G and shows that the RHS of (66) can be made an exponentially decaying
function of n. To bound the probability (with respect to a random superposition codebook) of (62) not producing
this exponential decay, we use one of the Chernoff bounds stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 (Chernoff Bound) Let
{
Xm
}M
m=1
be a collection of i.i.d. random variables with Xm ∈ [0, B] and
EXm ≤ µ 6= 0, for all m ∈ [1 : M ]. Then for any c with
c
µ ≥ 1
P
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Xm ≥ c
)
≤ e
−Mµ
B
(
c
µ (ln
c
µ
−1)+1
)
. (70a)
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Furthermore, if cµ ∈ [1, 2], then
P
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Xm ≥ c
)
≤ e−
Mµ
3B (
c
µ
−1)
2
. (70b)
For the proof of the bounds see [12, Appendix C] (Equation (119) therein proves the first bound, while (122)
establishes the second). Having Lemma 6, we show that
∫
dPBn,2 is exponentially small with probability doubly-
exponentially close to 1. To do so we exploit the fact that for any j ∈ Jn, the structure of the superposition code
implies that the collection
{(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)}
i∈In
comprises i.i.d. pairs of random variables. Consequently,
denoting
f(u,v) , PQn
W |U,V
(
(u,v,W) /∈ A
ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
,ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
∣∣∣U = u,V = v), (71)
we have that
{
f
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)}
i∈In
are i.i.d. for any j ∈ Jn, and that
Ef
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≤ 2
−nβ
(1)
α,δ1 + 2
−nβ
(2)
α,δ2 , ∀(i, j) ∈ In × Jn. (72)
For any c ∈ R+ consider now the following:
P
(∫
dPBn,2 ≥ c
)
= P

2−n(R1+R2) ∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
f
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c


≤ P

 ⋃
j∈Jn
{
2−n(R1+R2)
∑
i∈In
f
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c · 2−nR2
}
≤
∑
j∈Jn
P
(
2−nR1
∑
i∈In
f
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c
)
(73)
where the last inequality is the union bound. Using (70b) on each of the summands from the RHS of (73) with
M = 2nR1 , µ = 2−nβ
(1)
α,δ1 + 2−nβ
(2)
α,δ2 , B = 1, and cµ = 2, gives
P
(
2−nR1
∑
i∈In
f
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ 2 ·
(
2
−nβ
(1)
α,δ1 + 2
−nβ
(2)
α,δ2
))
≤ e
− 132
nR1
(
2
−nβ
(1)
α,δ1+2
−nβ
(2)
α,δ2
)
≤ e−
1
32
n(R1−β(1)α,δ1) . (74)
Inserting (74) into (73), we have
P
(∫
dPBn,2 ≥ 2 ·
(
2−nβ
(1)
α,δ1 + 2−nβ
(2)
α,δ2
))
≤ 2nR2 · e−
1
32
n(R1−β(1)α,δ1) , (75)
for which α > 1 can be chosen to produce a double-exponential convergence to 0 of the RHS because
R1 − β
(1)
α,δ1
=
αR1 + (α − 1)
(
δ1 + dα(QU,W , QUQW )
)
2α− 1
> 0, ∀α > 1. (76)
We now move on to treat the random variables ∆Bn,1(w), where w ∈ W
n, and show that the it also decays
exponentially fast with probability doubly-exponentially close to 1. To simplify notation, for each w ∈ Wn, let
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gw : U
n × Vn → R+ be a function specified by
gw(u,v) =
dQW |U=u,V=v
dQnW
(w)1{(
u,v,w
)
∈A
ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
,ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
}. (77)
Accordingly, note that
∆Bn,1(w) = 2
−n(R1+R2)
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
= 2−nR1
∑
i∈In

2−nR2 ∑
j∈Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
),
(78)
where the RHS is an average of 2nR1 i.i.d. random variables due to the structure of the superposition codebook.
Next, for any c′ ∈ R+ and i ∈ In define
Di(c
′) =

2−nR2 ∑
j∈Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c′ · 2
n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
 , (79a)
and set
D(c′) =
⋃
i∈In
Di(c
′). (79b)
Consider the following upper bound on the probability that ∆Bn,1(w) is lower bounded by some constant c ∈ R+.
For any w ∈ Wn, we have
P
(
∆Bn,1(w) ≥ c
)
= P

2−n(R1+R2) ∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c


≤ P
(
D(c′)
)
+ P

2−n(R1+R2) ∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c
∣∣∣∣∣∣D(c′)c


(a)
≤
∑
i∈In
P

2−nR2 ∑
j∈Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c′ · 2
n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
+ P

2−n(R1+R2) ∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c
∣∣∣∣∣∣D(c′)c


(b)
≤
∑
i∈In
∫
u∈Un
dP
(
U(i,BU ) = u
)
P

2−nR2 ∑
j∈Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
≥ c′ ·2
n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)∣∣∣∣∣∣U(i,BU )=u


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1(i,u)
+ P

2−nR1 ∑
i∈In

2−nR2 ∑
j∈Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
) ≥ c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∀i ∈ I, Di(c
′)c


︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
(80)
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To invoke the Chernoff bound from (70a) on P1(i,u), where i ∈ In and u ∈ U
n, first note that
conditioned on U(i,BU ) = u,
{
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)}
j∈Jn
are i.i.d. Furthermore, each random variable
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
is upper bounded by 2
n
(
I(U,V ;W )+ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
)
with probability 1, and has an expectation that
is upper bounded as
E
[
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)∣∣∣U(i,BU ) = u]
= E

dQW |U=u,V=V(i,j,BV )dQnW (w)1{(u,V(i,j,BV ),w)∈A
ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
,ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
}
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣U(i,BU ) = u


≤ 1{ dQn
W |U=u
dQn
W
(w)≤2
n(I(U;W )+ǫ(1)α,δ1)
} dQW |U=u
dQnW
(w)
≤ 2
n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
. (81)
Using (70a) with M = 2nR2 , µ = 2
n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
, B = 2
n
(
I(U,V ;W )+ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
)
, and c = c′ ·µ, for any c′ ≥ 1µ , gives
P1(i,u) ≤ e
−2
n(R2−I(V ;W |U)+ǫ(1)α,δ1−ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
)(
c′(ln c′−1)+1
)
, ∀(i,u) ∈ In × U
n. (82)
Next, for P2, we have that
{
2−nR2
∑
j∈Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)}
i∈In
are i.i.d. by the codebook construc-
tion. The conditioning on D(c′)c implies that each random variable 2−nR2
∑
j∈Jn
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
, for
i ∈ In, is bounded between 0 and c
′ · 2
n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
, with probability 1. The expected value of each term with
respect to the codebook is bounded above by one, which is observed by removing the indicator function from
gw
(
U(i,BU ),V(i, j,BV )
)
. Setting M = 2nR1 , µ = 1, B = 2
n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
, and any c ∈ [1, 2] into (70b), gives
P2 ≤ e
− 13 2
n(R1−I(U;W )−ǫ(1)α,δ1 )(c−1)2 . (83)
Inserting (82) and (83) into (80), we have that for any w ∈ Wn, c ∈ [1, 2] and c′ ≥ 2
−n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
P
(
∆Bn,1(w) ≥ c
)
≤ 2nR1e−2
n(R2−I(V ;W |U)+ǫ(1)α,δ1−ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
)(
c′(ln c′−1)+1
)
+ e−
1
32
n(R1−I(U;W )−ǫ(1)α,δ1) (c−1)2
c′ . (84)
Our next step is to choose c and c′ to get a doubly-exponentially decaying function on the RHS of (84). Let
c′ = 2
n
(
I(V ;W |U)−R2−ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
+ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
+2β
(2)
α,δ2
+
δ2
2
)
− 1, (85)
and note that the exponent is strictly positive since
I(V ;W |U)−R2 − ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
+ ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
+ 2β
(2)
α,δ2
+
δ2
2
(a)
= R1 − I(U ;W )−
δ2
2
− ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
=
2(α− 1)
[
R1 − dα(QU,W , QUQW )− δ1
]
+ 2α−12 (2δ1 − δ2)
2α− 1
> 0
where (a) is because ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
+ 2β
(2)
α,δ2
= R1 + R2 − I(U, V ;W ) − δ2 and the positivity is by the choice of α from
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Lemma 5 and since δ2 < 2δ1. Consequently, c
′ → ∞ as n → ∞, and therefore, c′ ≥ 2
−n
(
I(U ;W )+ǫ
(1)
α,δ1
)
for
sufficiently large n. Since c′ is unbounded (as a function of n), for n large enough we also have ln c′ − 1 ≥ 1,
which simplifies the RHS of (84) as
2nR1e−2
n(R2−I(V ;W |U)+ǫ(1)α,δ1−ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
)(
c′(ln c′−1)+1
)
≤ 2nR1e−2
n(R2−I(V ;W |U)+ǫ(1)α,δ1−ǫ
(2)
α,δ2
)
(c′+1)
= 2nR1e−2
n(2β(2)α,δ2+
δ2
2 )
, (86)
which shrinks doubly-exponentially quickly to 0.
Setting c = 1 + 2−n
δ1
4 , we upper bound the second term from the RHS of (84) by
e−
1
32
n(R1−I(U;W )−ǫ(1)α,δ1) (c−1)2
c′ ≤ e
− 132
n(R1−I(U;W )−ǫ(1)α,δ1 ) (c−1)2
(c′+1) = e−
1
32
n
δ2−δ1
2 , (87)
which also converges to 0 with double-exponential speed because δ1 < δ2.
Concluding, (84), (87) and (87) upper bound the probability of interest as
P
(
∆Bn,1(w) ≥ 1 + 2
−n
δ1
4
)
≤ 2nR1e−2
n(2β(2)α,δ2+
δ2
2 )
+ e−
1
32
n
δ2−δ1
2 . (88)
At this point, we specialize to W being a finite set. Consequently, ∆Bn,2 is bounded as
∆Bn,2(w) ≤
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
)n
, ∀w ∈ Wn, (89)
with probability 1. Notice that the maximum is only over the support of QW , which makes this bound finite. The
underlying reason for this restriction is that with probability one a conditional distribution is absolutely continuous
with respect to any of its associated marginal distributions.
Having (75), (88) and (89), we can now bound the probability that the RHS of (60) is not exponentially small.
Let S be the set of superposition codebooks Bn, such that all of the following are true:∫
dPBn,2 < 2 ·
(
2
−nβ
(1)
α,δ1 + 2
−nβ
(2)
α,δ2
)
, (90a)
∆Bn,1(w) < 1 + 2
−n
δ1
4 , ∀w ∈ Wn, (90b)
∆Bn,2(v) ≤
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
)n
, ∀w ∈ Wn. (90c)
First, we use the union bound, while taking advantage of the fact that the space Wn is only exponentially large, to
show that the probability of a random codebook not being in S is double-exponentially small:
P
(
Bn /∈ S
) (a)
≤ P
(∫
dPBn,2 ≥ 2 · 2
−nβα,δ
)
+
∑
w∈Wn
P
(
∆Bn,1(w) ≥ 1 + 2
−βα,δn
)
+
∑
w∈Wn
P
(
∆Bn,2(w) >
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
)n)
(b)
≤ 2nR2 · e−
1
3 2
n(R1−β(1)α,δ1) + |W|n
[
2nR1e−2
n(2β(2)α,δ2+
δ2
2 )
+ e−
1
32
n
δ2−δ1
2
]
(91)
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where (a) is the union bound, (b) uses (75), (88) and (89).
Next, we claim that for every codebook in S, the RHS of (60) is exponentially small. Let Bn ∈ S and consider
the following. For every x ∈ [0, 1], h(x) ≤ x log ex , using which (90a) implies that
h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
= h
(∫
dPBn,2
)
< 2
[
log e− log 2 · log
(
2
−nβ
(1)
α,δ1 + 2
−nβ
(2)
α,δ2
)](
2
−nβ
(1)
α,δ1 + 2
−nβ
(2)
α,δ2
)
(a)
≤ 4
(
log e+ 2βα,δ1,δ2 log 2
)
n2−nβα,δ1,δ2 , (92)
where (a) follows by setting βα,δ1,δ2 , min
{
β
(1)
α,δ1
, β
(2)
α,δ2
}
. Furthermore, by (90b), we have∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1 <
∫
dPBn,1 log
(
1 + 2−n
δ1
4
)
= log
(
1 + 2−n
δ1
4
) (a)
≤ 2−n
δ1
4 log e, (93)
where (a) is since log(1 + x) ≤ x log e, for every x > 0. Finally, using (90c) and the definition of βα,δ1,δ2 , we
obtain∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2 ≤
∫
dPBn,2 log
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
)n
< 2 log
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
)
n2−nβα,δ1,δ2 .
(94)
Combining (92)-(94) while setting γα,δ1,δ2 , min
{
βα,δ1,δ2 ,
δ1
4
}
, yields
h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
+
∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1 +
∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2
<
(
4
(
log e + 2βα,δ1,δ2 log 2
)
+ log e+ 2 log
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
))
n2−nγα,δ1,δ2
(a)
= cα,δ1,δ2n2
−nγα,δ1,δ2 (95)
where (a) comes from setting
cα,δ1,δ2 , 4
(
log e+ 2βα,δ1,δ2 log 2
)
+ log e+ 2 log
(
max
w∈supp(QW )
1
QW (w)
)
. (96)
This implies that
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
W
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnW) ≥ cα,δ1,δ2n2−nγα,δ1,δ2
)
≤ P
(
h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
+
∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1 +
∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2 ≥ cα,δn2
−nβα,δ
)
≤ P
(
Bn /∈ S
)
(a)
≤ 2nR2 · e−
1
32
n(R1−β(1)α,δ1) + |W|n
[
2nR1e−2
n(2β(2)α,δ2+
δ2
2 )
+ e−
1
3 2
n
δ2−δ1
2
]
(b)
≤ 2nR2 · e−
1
3 2
nδ1
+ |W|n
[
2nR1e−2
n
δ2
2 + e−
1
3 2
n
δ2−δ1
2
]
, (97)
where (a) follows from (91), while (b) is because β
(1)
α,δ1
≤ 12 (R1 − δ1) and β
(2)
α,δ2
≥ 0. Denoting cδ1,δ2 ,
32
supα>1 cα,δ1,δ2 , (97) further gives
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
W
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnW) ≥ cδ1,δ2n2−nγα,δ1,δ2
)
≤ 2nR2 · e−
1
32
nδ1
+ |W|n
[
2nR1e−2
n
δ2
2 + e−
1
32
n
δ2−δ1
2
]
. (98)
Since (98) holds for all α > 1 (the interesting values of α are those from Lemma 5, but the derivation is valid for all
α > 1), it must also be true, with strict inequality in the LHS, when replacing γα,δ1,δ2 with γδ1,δ2 , supα>1 γα,δ1,δ2 ,
which is the exponential rate of convergence stated in (14a) that we derive for the strong SCL. This establishes the
statement from (13) and proves Lemma 1.
Concluding, if R1 > I(U ;W ), R1 + R2 > I(U, V ;W ), then for any δ1 ∈
(
0, R1 − I(U ;W )
)
and δ2 ∈(
0, R1 + R2 − I(U, V ;W )
)
with δ1 < δ2 < 2δ1, we get exponential convergence of the relative entropy at rate
O(2−nγδ1,δ2 ) with doubly-exponential certainty. Discarding the precise exponents of convergence and coefficients,
we state that there exist γ1, γ2 > 0, such that for n large enough
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
W
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnW) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (99)
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix ǫ > 0 and a conditional PMF QU,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X ). For any n ∈ N, let M ∼ PM ∈ P(Mn), be
the message distribution. We first show that for any R ∈ R+ with R < RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, there exists a semantically-
secure sequence of (n,R)-codes with a vanishing average error probability, i.e., when M ∼ p
(U)
Mn
- the uniform
distribution over Mn. Afterwards, the uniform message distribution assumption for the error probability analysis
is dropped using the expurgation technique [15, Theorem 7.7.1], which allows upgrading reliability to achieve a
vanishing maximal error probability, while preserving SS.
Codebook Bn: We use a superposition codebook similar to the one described in Section III, with the main
difference being that here the outer layer also encodes the confidential message. The codebook is constructed
independently of the state sequence S, but with sufficient redundancy to correlate the transmission with S.
Let I and J be two independent random variables uniformly distributed over In ,
[
1 : 2nR1
]
and Jn ,
[
1 :
2nR2
]
, respectively.3 Let B
(n)
U ,
{
U(i)
}
i∈In
be a random inner layer codebook defined as in Section III. Namely,
B
(n)
U is a set of random vectors of length n that are i.i.d. according to Q
n
U . An outcome of B
(n)
U is denoted by
B
(n)
U ,
{
u(i)
}
i∈In
.
To describe the outer layer codebook, fix B
(n)
U and for every i ∈ In let B
(n)
V (i) ,
{
V(i, j,m)
}
(j,m)∈Jn×Mn
be a collection of i.i.d. random vectors of length n with distribution QnV |U=u(i). A random outer layer codebook
(with respect to an inner codebook B
(n)
U ) is defined as B
(n)
V ,
{
B
(n)
V (i)
}
i∈In
. A realization of B
(n)
V (i), for i ∈ In,
is denoted by B
(n)
V ,
{
v(i, j,m)
}
(j,m)∈Jn×Mn
, while B
(n)
V denotes a realization of B
(n)
V . S random superposition
codebook is Bn ,
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V
}
, while Bn =
{
B
(n)
U ,B
(n)
V
}
denotes a fixed codebook.
3Again, for simplicity of notation we assume that 2nR , 2nR1 and 2nR2 are integers.
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Let Bn be the set of all possible outcomes of Bn. The above codebook construction induces a PMF µ ∈ P(Bn)
over the codebook ensemble. For every Bn ∈ Bn, we have
µ(Bn) =
∏
i∈Ib
QnU
(
u(i)
) ∏(
iˆ,j,m
)
∈In×Jn×Mm
QnV |U
(
v
(
iˆ, j,m
)∣∣∣u(ˆi)). (100)
The encoder and decoder are described next for any superposition codebook Bn ∈ Bn.
Encoder f
(Bn)
n : The encoding phase is based on the likelihood-encoder [9], which, in turn, allows us to
approximate the (rather cumbersome) induced joint distribution by a simpler distribution which we use for the
analysis.
To send m ∈ Mn upon observing the state sequence s ∈ S
n, the encoder randomly chooses (i, j) ∈ In × Jn
according to
Pˆ (Bn)(i, j|m, s) =
QnS|U,V
(
s
∣∣u(i),v(i, j,m))∑
(i′,j′)∈In×Jn
QnS|U,V
(
s
∣∣u(i′),v(i′, j′,m)) , (101)
whereQS|U,V is the conditional marginal ofQS,U,V defined byQS,U,V (s, u, v) =
∑
x∈X WS(s)QU,V,X|S(u, v, x|s),
for every (s, u, v) ∈ S × U × V . The channel input sequence is then generated by feeding the chosen u- and
v-codewords along with the state sequence into a DMC QX|U,V,S , i.e., it is sampled from the random vector
X ∼ QnX|U=u(i),V=v(i,j,m),S=s.
Accordingly, the (stochastic) encoding function f
(Bn)
n :Mn × S
n → P(Xn) is given by
f (Bn)n (x|m, s) =
∑
(i,j)∈In×Jn
Pˆ (Bn)(i, j|m, s)QnX|U,V,S
(
x
∣∣u(i),v(i, j,m), s), ∀(m, s,x) ∈Mn × Sn ×Xn. (102)
Decoder φ
(Bn)
n : We define three decoding functions:
1) φ
(Bn)
n : Yn → Mˆn, which is the actual decoder of the message m.
2) ψ
(Bn)
n,I : Y
n → Iˆn, where Iˆn , In ∪ {e}.
3) ψ
(Bn)
n,J : Y
n → Jˆn, where Jˆn , Jn ∪ {e}.
Here e is the same error symbol from the definition of Mˆn for which we assume e /∈Mn∪In∪Jn. The functions
ψ
(Bn)
n,I and ψ
(Bn)
n,J are subsequently used for the reliability analysis.
Upon observing y ∈ Yn, the decoder searches for a unique triple (ˆi, jˆ, mˆ) ∈ In × Jn ×Mn such that(
u(ˆi),v(ˆi, jˆ, mˆ),y
)
∈ T nǫ (QU,V,Y ). (103)
If such a unique triple is found, then set φ
(Bn)
n (y) = mˆ, ψ
(Bn)
n,I (y) = iˆ and ψ
(Bn)
n,J (y) = jˆ; otherwise, φ
(Bn)
n (y) =
ψ
(Bn)
n,I (y) = ψ
(Bn)
n,J (y) = e.
The triple (Mn, f
(Bn)
n , φ
(Bn)
n ) defined with respect to the codebook Bn constitutes an (n,R)-code cn. The joint
distribution P (Bn) over Mn × S
n × In × Jn × U
n × Vn ×Xn × Yn ×Zn × Mˆn induced by a fixed Bn is
P (Bn)(s,m, i, j,u,v,x,y, z, mˆ) =
1
|Mn|
WnS (s)Pˆ
(Bn)(i, j|m, s)1{
u=u(i)
}
∩
{
v=v(i,j,m)
}
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×QnX|U,V,S(x|u,v, s)W
n
Y,Z|X,S(y, z|x, s)1
{
φ
(Bn)
n (y)=mˆ
}.
(104)
If PM = p
(U)
Mn
, i.e., the message distribution is uniform, we write P¯ (Bn) instead of P (Bn).
Approximating Distribution: Our next step is to show that P (Bn) is close in total variation to a new (and
simpler) distribution Γ(Bn), which we use for the reliability and security analyses. For any PM ∈ P(Mn), we
define Γ(Bn) by
Γ(Bn)(m, i, j,u,v, s,x,y, z, mˆ) = PM (m)2
−n(R1+R2)1{
u=u(i)
}
∩
{
v=v(i,j,m)
}QnS|U,V (s|u,v)
×QnX|U,V,S(x|u,v, s)W
n
Y,Z|X,S(y, z|x, s)1
{
φ
(Bn)
n (y)=mˆ
}, (105)
As before, when PM = p
(U)
Mn
, the notation Γ¯(Bn) replaces Γ(Bn). The following lemma states sufficient conditions
for the total variation between Γ(Bn) and P (Bn) to converge exponentially fast to zero with double-exponential
certainty (with respect to a random superposition codebook Bn).
Lemma 7 (Sufficient Conditions for Approximation) If
R1 > I(U ;S) (106a)
R1 +R2 > I(U, V ;S), (106b)
then there exist α1, α2 > 0, such that for any n large enough
P
(
max
PM∈P(Mn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
− Γ
(Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nα1
)
≤ e−e
nα2
. (107)
In particular, for any such n it also holds that
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
− Γ¯
(Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nα1 + n log
(
1
µS
)
e−e
nα2
, (108)
where µS = mins∈supp(WS)WS(s) > 0.
The proof of Lemma 7 relies on the strong SCL for superposition codes and some basic properties of total
variation. See Appendix H for details. Lemma 7 is key in analysing the performance of the proposed code. For
the reliability part, on which we focus next, we overlook the stronger claim from (107) and use the convergence
of the expected value stated in (108) to show that the average error probability can be made arbitrarily small. The
expurgation method [15, Theorem 7.7.1] is then used to upgrade to a vanishing maximal error probability.
Average Error Probability Analysis: We first establish reliability when PM = p
(U)
Mn
. The main idea here is to
use Lemma 7 to move away from analysing the error probability under P¯ (Bn) to an analysis with respect to Γ¯(Bn).
As shown subsequently, analysing the latter involves only standard and simple typicality arguments.
A code cn (with respect to a fixed superposition codebook Bn) and a uniformly distributed message induce the
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joint distribution P¯ (Bn) (see (104)). The average error probability ea(cn) associated with cn can be expressed as
ea(cn) = 2
−nR
∑
m∈Mn
em(cn) = PP¯ (Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
, (109)
where the subscript P¯ (Bn) on RHS indicates that the probability measure is induced by the PMF P¯ (Bn).
We first show that a sufficient condition for the RHS of (109) to become arbitrarily small is that the average
error probability induced by the Γ¯(Bn) PMF, i.e., PΓ¯(Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
, is small. Recall the following property of total
variation (see, e.g., [9, Property (b)]): Let µ, ν be two measures on a measurable space (X ,F) and g : X → R be
a non-negative measurable function bounded by b ∈ R. It holds that
∣∣Eµg − Eνg∣∣ ≤ b · ∣∣∣∣µ− ν∣∣∣∣TV (110)
For every n ∈ N, define g
(Bn)
n :Mn × Mˆn → R+ as
g(Bn)n (m, mˆ) = 1
{
mˆ 6=m
}, ∀(m, mˆ) ∈Mn × Mˆn, (111)
and note that
EP¯ (Bn)g
(Bn)
n (M, Mˆ) = PP¯ (Bn)
(
Mˆ 6=M
)
, (112a)
EΓ¯(Bn)g
(Bn)
n (M, Mˆ) = PΓ¯(Bn)
(
Mˆ 6=M
)
. (112b)
The property from (110) gives that for any Bn∣∣∣PP¯ (Bn)(Mˆ 6=M)− PΓ¯(Bn)(Mˆ 6= M)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn)M,Mˆ − Γ¯(Bn)M,Mˆ ∣∣∣∣∣∣TV
(a)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
− Γ¯
(Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
, (113)
where (a) follows because for any PX,Y , QX,Y ∈ P(X ×Y) with marginals PX and QX , respectively, it holds that∣∣∣∣PX − QX ∣∣∣∣TV ≤ ∣∣∣∣PX,Y − QX,Y ∣∣∣∣TV. We use the shorthand ∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn) − Γ¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣TV for the total variation from
the RHS of (113) and rewrite it as
PΓ¯(Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn) − Γ¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ PP¯ (Bn)
(
Mˆ 6=M
)
≤ PΓ¯(Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn) − Γ¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
. (114)
Taking an expectation over the ensemble of superposition codebooks, we obtain
EBnPΓ¯(Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
− EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn) − Γ¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ EBnPP¯ (Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
≤ EBnPΓ¯(Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
+ EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn) − Γ¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
. (115)
Lemma 7 states that EBn
∣∣∣∣∣∣P¯ (Bn)− Γ¯(Bn)∣∣∣∣∣∣ can be made arbitrarily small with n provided that (106) are satisfied.
To show that the expected average error probability under Γ¯(Bn) also converges to 0 with n consider the following.
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For every codebook Bn and (˜i, j˜, m˜) ∈ In × Jn ×Mn, define the event
E (˜i, j˜, m˜,Bn) =
{(
u(˜i),v(˜i, j˜, m˜),Y
)
∈ T nǫ (QU,V,Y )
}
, (116)
where Y ∼ Qn
Y |U=u(˜i)V=v(˜i,j˜,m˜)
is the random sequence observed at the receiver when the transmitter sends
(˜i, j˜, m˜) over the effective DMC QnY |U,V defined by
QY |U,V (y|u, v) =
∑
(s,x,z)∈S×X×Z
QS|U,V (s|u, v)QX|S,U,V (x|s, u, v)WY,Z|X,S(y, z|x, s), ∀(u, v, y) ∈ U × V × Y.
(117)
Furthermore, the PMF QU,V,Y with respect to which the letter-typical set on the RHS of (116) is defined is the
marginal of WSQU,V,X|SWY,Z|X,S .
To upper bound the expected average error probability under Γ¯(Bn), for each Bn, we extend Γ¯
(Bn) to the space
Mn × S
n × In × Jn × U
n × Vn ×Xn × Yn ×Zn × Mˆn × Iˆn × Jˆn by
Γ¯(Bn)(m, i, j,u,v, s,x,y, z, mˆ, iˆ, jˆ) = Γ¯(Bn)(m, i, j,u,v, s,x,y, z, mˆ)1{
ψ
(Bn)
n,I
(y)=iˆ
}
∩
{
ψ
(Bn)
n,J
(y)=jˆ
}, (118)
thus allowing us to accounts for errors in decoding I and J as well. We have the following upper bound
EBnPΓ¯(Bn)
(
Mˆ 6= M
) (a)
≤ EBnPΓ¯(Bn)
(
(Mˆ, Iˆ, Jˆ) 6= (M, I, J)
)
(b)
≤ EBnPΓ¯(Bn)
(
(Mˆ, Iˆ, Jˆ) 6= (1, 1, 1)
∣∣∣(M, I, J) = (1, 1, 1))
(c)
= EBnPΓ¯(Bn)

E(1, 1, 1,Bn)c ∪

⋃
i˜6=1
E (˜i, 1, 1,Bn)


∪

 ⋃
(j˜,m˜) 6=(1,1)
E(1, j˜, m˜,Bn)

 ∪

 ⋃
(˜i,j˜,m˜) 6=(1,1,1)
E (˜i, j˜, m˜,Bn)




(d)
≤ PQn
U,V,Y
(
(U,V,Y) ∈ T nǫ (QU,V,Y )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
+
∑
i˜6=1
PQn
U,V
×Qn
Y
(
(U,V,Y) ∈ T nǫ (QU,V,Y )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
+
∑
(j˜,m˜) 6=(1,1)
PQn
U,V
×Qn
Y |U
(
(U,V,Y) ∈ T nǫ (QU,V,Y )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P3
+
∑
(˜i,j˜,m˜) 6=(1,1,1)
PQn
U,V
×Qn
Y
(
(U,V,Y) ∈ T nǫ (QU,V,Y )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P4
where:
(a) is because the probability of error in decoding M is upper bounded by the probability of error in decoding
(I, J,M);
(b) follows by the symmetry of the code under Γ¯(Bn) with respect to (i, j,m);
(c) is definition of the decoding rules φ
(Bn)
n , ψ
(Bn)
n,I and ψ
(Bn)
n,J ;
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(d) uses the union bound and takes the expectation over the ensemble of codebooks.
By the law of large numbers P1 → 0 as n → ∞, while P2, P3 and P4 all converge to 0 as n grows provided
that
R+R2 < I(V ;Y |U), (119a)
R+R1 +R2 < I(U, V ;Y ). (119b)
Specifically, (119a) implies that P3 → 0 as n → ∞, while (119b) ensures that both P2 → 0 and P4 → 0 as
n→∞. This is since a sufficient condition for the former is in fact
R1 < I(U, V ;Y ). (120)
However, (120) is clearly redundant having (119b). Concluding, as long as (106) and (119) are simultaneously
satisfied, we have
EBnea(Cn) −−−−→
n→∞
0. (121)
Security Analysis: The security analysis is based on the approximation of P (Bn) using Γ(Bn), for any Pm ∈
P(Mn). We first show that if SS is achieved under Γ
(Bn), then it is also achieved under P (Bn). Having that, it
remain to be shown that SS is attainable under Γ(Bn); this is established by relying on the heterogeneous version
of the strong SCL from [13, Lemma 1]. The underlying idea behind the rate bound we derive for SS is to allow the
eavesdropper to decode the inner layer codeword, thus making him waste channel resources on decoding a codeword
that carries no confidential information. The remaining resources are insufficient for extracting any information on
the outer layer codeword, which, in turn, results in our code being semantically-secure.
To justify that achieving SS under Γ(Bn) is sufficient for achieving it under P (Bn), we introduce the following
lemma.
Lemma 8 (SS for Induced vs. Approximating Distribution) Let Bn be a superposition codebook for which there
exists a β1 > 0, such that for all PM ∈ P(Mn) and sufficiently large values of n∣∣∣∣∣∣PMP (Bn)Z|M − PMΓ(Bn)Z|M ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nβ1. (122)
Then, there exists a β2 > 0, such that for all PM ∈ P(Mn) and n large enough (possibly larger then the values
of n needed for (122) to become valid)
∣∣∣IP (M ;Z)− IΓ(M ;Z)∣∣∣ ≤ e−nβ2, (123)
where the subscripts P and Γ indicate that a mutual information term is calculated with respect to P (Bn) or Γ(Bn),
respectively.
The proof of Lemma 8 is relegated to Appendix I. As subsequently shown, the existence of a codebook Bn that
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satisfies (122) essentially follows by Lemma 7. For such a Bn, we have that for any PM ∈ P(Mn)
IP (M ;Z) ≤ IΓ(M ;Z) + e
−nβ2 , (124)
for n sufficiently large. In particular, (124) also holds for P ⋆M , the maximizer of IP (M ;Z) (that exists due to
concavity). Further increasing the RHS by maximizing it over all PM ∈ P(Mn) as well, gives
ℓSem(cn) = max
PM∈P(Mn)
IP (M ;Z) ≤ max
PM∈P(Mn)
IΓ(M ;Z) + e
−nβ2 , (125)
where cn is the code associated with Bn. Thus, finding a codebook for which the RHS of (125) can be made
arbitrarily small implies SS.
With that in mind, we now focus on the maximized mutual information term from the RHS of (125). For any
Bn and PM ∈ P(Mn), we have
IΓ(M ;Z) ≤ IΓ(M ; I,U,Z)
= IΓ(M ;Z|I,U)
= D
(
Γ
(Bn)
M,Z|I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣PMΓ(Bn)Z|I,U∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U )
(a)
= D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|I,U∣∣∣PMΓ(Bn)I,U )
(b)
≤ D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣PMΓ(Bn)I,U ), (126)
where (a) is by the relative entropy chain rule and because Γ
(Bn)
M|I,U = PM , while (b) follows because
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|I,U∣∣∣PMΓ(Bn)I,U ) = D(Γ(Bn)Z|M,I,U∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣PMΓ(Bn)I,U )−D(Γ(Bn)Z|I,U∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U ) (127)
and due to the non-negativity or relative entropy. Although, the inequality from (126) is true for any QZ|U : U →
P(Z), by QZ|U we refer to the conditional marginal of the joint single-letter distribution WSQU,V,X|SWY,Z|X,S .
Maximizing (126) over all message distributions, we further obtain
max
PM∈P(Mn)
IΓ(M ;Z) ≤ max
PM∈P(Mn)
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣PMΓ(Bn)I,U )
= max
PM∈P(Mn)
∑
m∈M
PM (m)D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U )
≤ max
PM∈P(M)
∑
m∈M
PM (m) max
m˜∈M
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m˜,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣PMΓ(Bn)I,U )
= max
m∈M
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U ). (128)
As stated next, a sufficient condition for the RHS of (128) to converge to zero with the blocklength is that a
corresponding total variation produces an exponential decay. This is an extension of the property mentioned in [23,
Remark 1].
Lemma 9 (Total Variation Dominates Relative Entropy) Let X and Y be finite sets, and for any n ∈ N let
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PX ∈ P(X
n), PY|X : X
n → P(Yn) and QY |X : X → P(Y). If PY|X=x ≪ Q
n
Y |X=x, for all x ∈ X
n, i.e.,
PY|X=x is absolutely contineous with respect to Q
n
Y |X=x, then
D
(
PY|X
∣∣∣∣QnY |X ∣∣PX) ≤ ∣∣∣∣PXPY|X −PXQnY |X ∣∣∣∣TV
(
n log |Y|+ log
1∣∣∣∣PXPY|X − PXQnY |X ∣∣∣∣TV + n logµY |X
)
,
(129)
where µY |X = min (x,y)∈X×Y:
QY |X (y|x)>0
QY |X(y|x).
See Appendix J for the proof of Lemma 9. It is easily verified that Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m,I=i,U=u ≪ Q
n
Z|U=u, for each
(i,m,u) ∈ In ×Mn × U
n, and therefore, the lemma implies that to get the RHS of (128) to converge to 0 with
n, it suffices to show that ∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
−−−−→
n→∞
0 (130)
exponentially fast for every m ∈Mn. To do so, note that for the ǫ > 0 that was fixed at the beginning of the proof
and for any m ∈ Mn, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ max
i∈In,
u∈T nǫ (QU )
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
+
∑
u/∈T nǫ (QU )
Γ(Bn)(u)
≤ max
i∈In,
u∈T nǫ (QU )
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
+ PΓ(Bn)
(
U(I,Bn) /∈ T
n
ǫ (QU )
)
(131)
where Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m,I=i,U=u is well defined if u = u(i,Bn), and otherwise we set Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m,I=i,U=u = Q
n
Z|U=u.
Let γ˜ > 0 be arbitrary (to be chosen later) and consider:
P
(
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> 4e−nγ˜
)
(a)
≤
∑
m∈Mn
P
(∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> 4e−nγ˜
)
(b)
≤
∑
m∈Mn
P

 max
i∈In,
u∈T nǫ (QU )
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
+ PΓ¯(Bn)
(
U(I,Bn) /∈ T
n
ǫ (QU )
)
> 4e−nγ˜


(c)
≤
∑
m∈Mn

 ∑
i∈In,
u∈T nǫ (QU )
P
(∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> 2e−nγ˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1(i,m,u)
+ P
(
PΓ(Bn)
(
U(I,Bn) /∈ T
n
ǫ (QU )
)
> 2e−nγ˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2

 (132)
where (a) and (c) are the union bound, while (b) uses (131).
For each (i,m,u) ∈ In×Mn×T
n
ǫ (QU ), we treat P1(i,m,u) by means of the heterogeneous strong SCL from
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[13, Lemma 1]. To show that P1(i,m,u) matches the framework of Lemma 1 from [13] consider the following:
P1(i,m,u) ≤ P
({∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ˜
}
∩
{
U(i,BU ) = u
})
+ P
({∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣TV > e−nγ˜
}
∩
{
U(i,BU ) 6= u
})
(a)
= P
({∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ˜
}
∩
{
U(i,BU ) = u
})
(133)
where (a) is because when U(i,BU ) 6= u, by definition, Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m,I=i,U=u = Q
n
Z|U=u, and hence the total variation
is 0, which nullifies the second probability term.
Now, recall that for any (i,m) ∈ In × Mn, B
(n)
V (i) =
{
V(i, j,m)
}
j∈Jn
is a collection of |Jn| = 2
−nR2
i.i.d. random vectors, each distributed according to QnV |U=u. For each realization B
(n)
V (i) of B
(n)
V (i) and every
(i,m,u) ∈ In ×Mn × T
n
ǫ (QU ), define the PMF
Λ
(
B
(n)
V (i),m
)
(j,v, z|u) = 2−nR21{
v=v
(
j,m,BV (i)
)}QnZ|U,V (z|u,v), (134)
where v
(
j,m,BV (i)
)
stands for v
(
i, j,m,BV
)
and is used to emphasize the dependence of Λ
(
B
(n)
V
(i),m
)
on the
sub-outer-layer-codebook BV (i) only. Based on (134), note the equivalence{∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I=i,U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ˜
}
∩
{
U(i,BU ) = u
}
=
{∣∣∣∣∣∣Λ(B(n)V (i),m)Z|U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ˜
}
∩
{
U(i,BU ) = u
}
, (135)
which, by inserting it into (133), implies
P1(i,m,u) ≤ P
({∣∣∣∣∣∣Λ(B(n)V (i),m)Z|U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ˜
}
∩
{
U(i,BU ) = u
})
≤ P
(∣∣∣∣∣∣Λ(B(n)V (i),m)Z|U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ˜
)
, ∀(i,m,u) ∈ In ×Mn × T
n
ǫ (QU ). (136)
The RHS of (136) corresponds to the exact setting of the heterogeneous SCL, where U = u plays the role of the
state sequence,
{
V(i, j,m)
}
j∈Jn
is the point-to-point codebook drawn conditioned on U = u, and QnZ|U=u is
conditional marginal of the state-dependent DMC QnZ|U=u,V . Thus, by [13, Lemma 1], if
R2 > Iνu(V ;Z|U) + ζ, (137)
where ζ > 0 is an arbitrarily small positive number and the subscript νu indicates that the mutual information term
is calculated with respect to the empirical PMF of u, i.e., according to νuQV |UQZ|U,V , then there exist δ1, δ2 > 0
uniformly in (i,m,u) ∈ In ×Mn × T
n
ǫ (QU ), such that
P
(∣∣∣∣∣∣Λ(B(n)V (i),m)Z|U=u −QnZ|U=u∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nδ1
)
≤ e−e
nδ2
, (138)
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for sufficiently large n. Consequently, taking
R2 > max
u∈T nǫ (QU )
Iνu(V ;Z|U) + ζ, (139)
and γ˜ ≤ δ1, we have that for every m ∈ Mn and n large enough
∑
i∈In,
u∈T nǫ (QU )
P1(i,m,u) ≤ 2
nR1 ·
∣∣T nǫ (QU )∣∣ · e−enδ2 , (140)
which decays to 0 as n→∞ with double-exponential speed.
For P2, we use the Chernoff bound from (70b) in Lemma 6 by noticing that
PΓ¯(Bn)
(
U(I,Bn) /∈ T
n
ǫ (QU )
)
= 2−nR1
∑
i∈In
PΓ(Bn)
(
U(i,Bn) /∈ T
n
ǫ (QU )
∣∣∣I = i) (141)
is an average of exponentially many i.i.d. random variables bounded in [0, 1] with expectation
EBnPΓ(Bn)
(
U(I,Bn) /∈ T
n
ǫ (QU )
)
= PQn
U
(
U /∈ T nǫ (QU )
)
≤ e−nη(ǫ), (142)
for some η(ǫ) > 0 with lim
ǫց0
η(ǫ) = 0 (see, e.g., [24, Lemma 5] for the exact exponent of decay). Thus, by the
Chernoff bound with M = 2nR1 , µ = e−nη(ǫ), B = 1, and cµ = 2, we have
P
(
PΓ(Bn)
(
U(I,Bn) /∈ T
n
ǫ (QU )
)
> 2e−nη(ǫ)
)
≤ e
2nR1e−nη(ǫ)
3 = e−
1
3 e
n
(
R1 ln 2−η(ǫ)
)
, (143)
which converges to zero doubly-exponentially fast as n→∞ for any ǫ > 0 with
R1 >
η(ǫ)
ln 2
. (144)
Thus, for any γ˜ ≤ η(ǫ), we have
P2 ≤ e
− 13
(
R1 ln 2−η(ǫ)
)
. (145)
Thus, as long as (139) and (144) are valid and 0 < γ˜ = min
{
δ1, η(ǫ)
}
, we may plug (140) and (145) back into
(132) while using the bound
∣∣T nǫ (QU )∣∣ ≤ 2HQ(U)(1+ǫ), to obtain
P
(
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> 4e−nγ˜
)
≤ 2nR
[
2n
(
R1+HQ(U)(1+ǫ)
)
· e−e
nδ2
+ e−
1
3 e
n
(
R1 ln 2−η(ǫ)
)]
, (146)
for all sufficiently large values of n.
We next replace the rate bound on R2 from (139) with a bound bound that involves only the single-letter PMF
QUQV |UQZ|U,V (rather the the empirical PMF of each u ∈ T
n
ǫ (QU ) in the role of QU ). By the continuity of
mutual information, there exists a positive real-valued function θ(ǫ) with lim
ǫց0
θ(ǫ) = 0, such that
∣∣∣IQ(V ;Z|U)− Iνu(V ;Z|U)∣∣∣ ≤ θ(ǫ), ∀u ∈ T nǫ (QU ), (147)
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where IQ indicates that the mutual information term is calculated with respect to QUQV |UQZ|U,V . Accordingly, if
R2 > IQ(V ;Z|U) + ζ + θ(ǫ), (148)
then (139) is satisfied. Now, recall that R1 > IQ(U ;S) (see (106a)) and that lim
ǫց0
η(ǫ) = 0. Therefore, there exists
ǫ1 > 0 sufficiently small for which R1 >
η(ǫ1)
ln 2 .
To conclude, if (106a) and (148) are satisfied, then (146) holds for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ1]. Overlooking the exact exponents
of convergence while noting that ǫ > 0 and ζ > 0 may be chosen arbitrarily small, we see that the rate bounds
(106a) and
R2 > I(V ;Z|U) (149)
ensure the existence of some γ1, γ2 > 0 and n1 ∈ N, such that for all n sufficiently large
P
(
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (150)
Code Extraction: Summarizing the results up to this point, we have that as long as (106), (119) and (149) are
simultaneously satisfied, EBnea(Cn) −−−−→n→∞
0 and for sufficiently large n
P
(
max
PM∈P(Mn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
− Γ
(Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nα1
)
≤ e−e
nα2
, (151a)
P
(
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
, (151b)
are true as well.
The Selection Lemma from [12, Lemma 5], implies the existence of a sequence of realizations
{
Bn
}
n∈N
of
superposition codebooks (giving rise to a sequence of (n,R)-codes
{
cn
}
n∈N
), for which
ea(cn) −−−−→
n→∞
0, (152a)
1{∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
−Γ
(Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
>e−nα1
} −−−−→
n→∞
0, (152b)
1{
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U−Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
>e−nγ1
} −−−−→
n→∞
0. (152c)
Since the indicator functions in (152b)-(152c) take only the values 0 and 1, to satisfy the convergence it must be
true that for any n large enough
max
PM∈P(Mn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
− Γ
(Bn)
M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z,Mˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nα1 , (153a)
and
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U Γ(Bn)Z|M=m,I,U − Γ(Bn)I,U QnZ|U ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nγ1 , (153b)
for any such n.
Now, by Lemma 9 and (128), the exponential decay of the total variation in (153b) implies that there exists a
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λ > 0, such that for all n large enough
max
PM∈P(Mn)
IΓ(M ;Z) ≤ max
m∈M
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m,I,U
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ|U ∣∣∣Γ(Bn)I,U ) ≤ e−nλ, (154)
which implies SS under Γ(Bn). Now, (153a) in particular means that (122) holds for β1 = α1, which by Lemma 8
and (125) implies that
ℓSem(cn) ≤ e
−λn + e−nβ2 , (155)
for some β2 > 0 and sufficiently large n.
Having (152a) and (155), we see that the sequence of (n,R)-codes
{
cn
}
n∈N
is reliable with respect to the
average error probability and semantically-secure. Our final step is to amend
{
cn
}
n∈N
to be reliable with respect
to the maximal error probability (as defined in (18a)). This is done using the expurgation technique (see, e.g., [15,
Theorem 7.7.1]). Let n be sufficiently large so that
ea(cn) = 2
−nR
∑
m∈Mn
em(cn) ≤
ǫ
2
, (156)
and remove from the message set all the messages that contribute more than ǫ to the average error probability.
In terms of the codebook Bn, if m ∈ Mn is a message with em(cn) ≥ ǫ, we discard the codewords{
v(i, j,m)
}
(i,j)∈In×Jn
. Denoting the amended sequence of codebooks by
{
B⋆n
}
n∈N
and their corresponding codes
by
{
c⋆n
}
n∈N
, we have
e(c⋆n) ≤ ǫ. (157)
Note that in each c⋆n there are 2
nR−1 codewords, i.e., throwing out half the codewords has changed the rate from R
to R− 1n , which is negligible for large n. Further note that because
{
cn
}
n∈N
is semantically-secure, so is
{
c⋆n
}
n∈N
.
Finally, applying the Fourier-Motzkin Elimination on (106), (119) and (149), shows that for any R < RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
the proposed (amended) code achieves e(c⋆n) → 0 and ℓSem(c
⋆
n) → 0 as n → ∞. Maximizing over all QU,V,X|S
establishes Theorem 1.
Remark 14 (Alternative SS Analysis) The SS analysis essentially shows that under the conditions (106) and
(149), the induced conditional distribution of Z given U and M = m approximates a product distribution QnZ|U ,
uniformly in m ∈ Mn. Since the inner layer codebook (which is encoded by U ) carries no confidential information,
this implies SS. An alternative approach for establishing SS is to make the induced conditional distribution of Z
given M = m (without U in the conditioning) be a good approximation of QnZ , for all m ∈ Mn. This, in effect,
implies SS because
max
PM∈Mn
IΓ(M ;Z) ≤ max
m∈M
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ). (158)
The strong SCL for superposition codebooks once again comes into play here and can be shown to make the RHS
of (158) decay exponentially fast to 0 with double-exponential certainty, provided that
R1 > I(U ;Z) (159a)
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R1 +R2 > I(U, V ;Z). (159b)
Replacing (149) with (159) and combining it with (106) and (119), achieves any R with
R ≤ RAltA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, min
{
I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;Z), I(V ;Y |U), I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S)
}
. (160)
Since one cannot prospectively determine which approach for the SS analysis (if any) is better, the resulting best
achievable rates for the SD-WTC would be the maximum between the RHS of (160) and RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
from (22).
However, a close look at the expressions in RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
and in RAlt
A
(
QU,V,X|S
)
reveals that when optimizing
over all QU,V,X|S , R
Alt
A
(
QU,V,X|S
)
is actually redundant. To see this notice that for any QU,V,X|S , such that
RAlt
A
(
QU,V,X|S
)
≥ RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
, taking PU˜,V˜,X˜|S with U˜ = 0, V˜ = (U, V )Q and PX˜|S,U˜,V˜ = QX|S,U,V , where
the subscript Q in the definition of V˜ denotes that the random variables are distributed according to Q, gives
RA
(
PU˜,V˜,X˜|S
)
= min
{
IQ(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;Z), I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S)
}
≥ RAltA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
. (161)
This implies that the approach for establishing SS given in the proof of Theorem 1 is superior to the alternative path
discussed in this remark. The interpretation of this conclusion is that it is always better to let the eavesdropper decode
U, since this makes it ‘waste’ channel resources on decoding a layer of the codebook that carries no confidential
information. After doing so, the eavesdropper is lacking the required resources to extract any information about M
(regardless of its distribution) and SS follows.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studied SD-WTCs with non-causal encoder CSI. A novel lower bound on the SS-capacity was derived.
The coding scheme that achieves the lower bound is based on a superposition codebook, which fully encodes the
confidential message in the outer layer. The superposition codebook was constructed with sufficient redundancy to
allow correlating the transmission with the observed state sequence. The correlation is performed by means of the
likelihood encoder [9]. SS is ensured via distribution approximation arguments and a strong SCL for superposition
codes. Via the union bound, the information leakage to the eavesdropper is shown to be negligible for all message
distribution. The structure of the rate bounds for secrecy implies that the eavesdropper can decode the inner layer
codeword. Since no confidential information is encoded in the inner layer, this doesn’t compromise security. The gain
from doing so is that decoding the inner layer exhausts the channel resources the eavesdropper posses. Consequently,
this prevents him from inferring any information on the outer layer, which contains the confidential message.
Our result was compared to several previous achievability results from the literature. A comparison to the best
past achievable scheme for the SD-WTC with non-causal encoder CSI from [4], [5] revealed that our scheme not
only captures it as a special case, but that it also strictly outperforms it in some cases. The strict relation was
illustrated via an explicit example. When particularizing to the scenario where the decoder also has full CSI, our
result was shown to be at least as good as the best known achievability by Chia and El-Gamal [6]. Finally, the
SS-capacity of a class of SD-WTC whose channel transition matrix decomposes into product of a WTC that is
independent of the state and a WTC that depends only on the state, was characterised. The characterization is under
45
the assumption that the WTC that is independent of S produces a less noisy output to the eavesdropper. It was
also shown that our scheme is tight for the semi-deterministic SD-WTD, where Y = g(X,S) is the deterministic
output observed by the legitimate receiver. This SS-capacity result, however, can also be retrieved from [4], [5].
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
As mentioned in Section IV-C, the inequality RAlt
A
≤ RA is straightforward. For the opposite direction consider
the following. Let Q⋆U,V,X|S : S → P(U × V × X ) be such that RA = RA(Q
⋆
U,V,X|S) > 0, i.e., RA is strictly
positive (otherwise there is nothing to prove) and it is achieved by the input distribution Q⋆U,V,X|S . Recall that the
mutual information terms in RA(Q
⋆
U,V,X|S) are taken with respect to Q
⋆ , WSQ
⋆
U,V,X|SWY,Z|X,S . First, note that
if Q⋆U,V,X|S is such that I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) ≥ 0, then RA ≤ R
Alt
A
(Q⋆U,V,X|S) ≤ R
Alt
A
and the inequality of interest
holds.
The opposite case requires more work. Assume that Q⋆U,V,X|S induces I(U ;Y )−I(U ;S) < 0, and let U
′ = (U, V˜ )
and V ′ = V , where V˜ is V passed through an erasure channel, with erasures independent of all the other random
variables. Denoting the probability of an erasure by ǫ ∈ [0, 1], the joint distribution of (S,U, V,X, Y, Z, V˜, U ′, V ′)
is given by
QS,U,V,X,Y,Z,V˜,U ′,V ′ = WSQ
⋆
U,V,X|SWY,Z|X,SWV˜ |V 1
{
U ′=(U,V˜ ),V ′=V
}, (162)
where WV˜ |V : V → V ∪ {?} for ? /∈ V , is the transition probability of a BEC(ǫ), and the exact value of ǫ is to
be specified later. All subsequent (and preceding) information measures in this proof are taken with respect to the
distribution from (162) or its appropriate marginals.
We first show that by a proper choice of ǫ ∈ [0, 1], the conditional marginal distribution QU ′,V ′,X|S is a valid
input distribution in RAlt
A
, i.e., that it satisfies
I(U ′;Y )− I(U ′, S) ≥ 0. (163)
Consider
I(U ′;Y )− I(U ′;S) = I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) + I(V˜ ;Y |U)− I(V˜ ;S|U)
= I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) + ǫ¯
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;S|U)
]
, (164)
where ǫ¯ = 1− ǫ. Notice that when ǫ = 1 this quantity is negative by assumption, while ǫ = 0 gives
I(U ′;Y )− I(U ′;S) = I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S) > 0 (165)
by the second rate bound in RA. We set ǫ ∈ [0, 1] at the value that produces I(U
′;Y )−I(U ′;S) = 0, thus satisfying
(163).
Being an appropriate input distribution in RAlt
A
, we evaluate RAlt
A
(QU ′,V ′,X|S) next. The simpler rate bound to
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start with is the second one, for which we have
I(U ′, V ′;Y )− I(U ′, V ′;S) = I(U, V, V˜ ;Y )− I(U, V, V˜ ;S)
(a)
= I(U, V ;Y )− I(U, V ;S) ≥ RA, (166)
where (a) uses the Markov chain (S,U,X, Y, Z)− V − V˜ , which follows because V˜ is a noisy version of V .
For the first rate bound, note that
I(V ′;Y |U ′)− I(V ′;Z|U ′) = I(V ;Y |U, V˜ )− I(V ;Z|U, V˜ )
(a)
= I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)−
[
I(V˜ ;Y |U)− I(V˜ ;Z|U)
]
(b)
= I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)− ǫ¯
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
]
= ǫ
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
]
, (167)
where, as before, (a) and (b) follow by Markovity. A similar derivation also gives
I(V ′;Y |U ′)− I(V ′;S|U ′) = ǫ
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;S|U)
]
. (168)
We complete the proof by considering two cases. First, if I(V ;S|U) ≥ I(V ;Z|U), we obtain
I(V ′;Y |U ′)− I(V ′;Z|U ′)
(a)
= ǫ
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
]
(b)
≥ ǫ
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;S|U)
]
(c)
= I(V ′;Y |U ′)− I(V ′;S|U ′)
(d)
= I(U ′, V ′;Y ′)− I(U ′, V ′;S)
(e)
≥ RA, (169)
where (a) is (167), (b) follows by the assumption that I(V ;S|U) ≥ I(V ;Z|U), (c) is (168), (d) is by choosing ǫ
to satisfy I(U ′;Y )− I(U ′;S) = 0, while (e) uses (166).
Second, observe that assuming I(V ;S|U) < I(V ;Z|U) produces:
I(V ′;Y |U ′)− I(V ′;Z|U ′)
(a)
= ǫ
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
]
= I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)− ǫ¯
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
]
(b)
> I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)− ǫ¯
[
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;S|U)
]
(c)
= I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)
(d)
≥ RA, (170)
where (a) is (167) as before, (b) is by the assumption in the second case, (c) uses (164) with I(U ′;Y )−I(U ′;S) = 0,
and finally (d) follows by the third rate bound in RA.
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Concluding, we see that
RAltA (QU ′,V ′,X|S) = min
{
I(V ′;Y |U ′)− I(V ′;Z|U ′), I(U ′, V ′;Y )− I(U ′, V ′;S)
}
≥ RA, (171)
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The inequality on the LHS of (29) is straightforward (allowing correlation between T and S cannot decrease the
achievable rate). Thus, we only need to show that for any PT,X|S : S → P(T × X ) there exists QU,V,X|S : S →
P(U × V × X ), such that
RCEG
(
PT,X|S
)
≤ REnc−Dec−CSI
Alt
(
QU,V,X|S
)
. (172)
Throughout the proof we use the notation IP and IQ to denote a mutual information term that is calculated with
respect to PT,X|S or QU,V,X|S , respectively. Fix PT,X|S : S → P(T × X ). If IP (T ;Y, S) ≤ IP (T ;Z), then
RCEG
(
PT,X|S
)
= min
{
IP (T ;Y |S), HP (S|T, Z)
}
, (173)
and we set U = T , V = S and QX|T,S = PX|T,S into R
Enc−Dec−CSI
A
(
QU,V,X|S
)
to get:
IQ(V ;Y, S|U)− IQ(V ;Z|U) = IP (S;Y, S|T )− IP (S;Z|T ) = HP (S|T, Z), (174a)
IQ(U, V ;Y, S)− IQ(U, V ;S) = IP (S, T ;Y, S)− IP (S, T ;S) = IP (T ;Y |S), (174b)
If, on the other hand, PT,X|S is such that IP (T ;Y, S) > IP (T ;Z), then
RCEG
(
PT,X|S
)
= min
{
IP (T ;Y |S), IP (T ;Y |S)− IP (T ;Z|S) +HP (S|Z)
}
. (175)
In this case we take U = 0, V = (T, S) and QX|T,S = PX|T,S . Substituting into R
Enc−Dec−CSI
A
(
QU,V,X|S
)
gives
IQ(V ;Y, S|U)− IQ(V ;Z|U) = IP (S, T ;Y, S)− IP (S, T ;Z)
= IP (T ;Y |S)− IP (T ;Z|S) +HP (S|Z), (176a)
IQ(U, V ;Y, S)− IQ(U, V ;S) = IP (S, T ;Y, S)− IP (S, T ;S) = IP (T ;Y |S), (176b)
from which (172) follows.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
A. Direct
We use Theorem 1 to establish the achievability of Corollary 1. For any QU,V,X|S : S → U × V ×X , replacing
Y and Z in RA
(
QU,V,X|S
)
with (Y.S1) and (Z, S2), respectively, gives that
RRLNA (QU,V,X|S) = min
{
I(V ;Y, S1|U)− I(V ;Z, S2|U), I(U, V ;Y, S1)− I(U, V ;S)
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, I(U, V ;Y, S1)− I(U ;S)− I(V ;Z, S2|U)
}
(177)
is achievable.
To properly define the choice of QU,V,X|S that achieves (32), recall the P distribution stated after (31) that factors
as WSPA|SPB|APXWS1,S2|SWY,Z|X and let P˜ be a PMF over S ×A×B×X ×Y ×Z ×S1×S2×B×X , such
that
P˜S,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z,B˜,X˜ = PS,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z1{B˜=B}∩{X˜=X}. (178)
Now, fix PS,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z and let QU,V,X|S in (22) be such that V = (A,B)P˜ , U = (B˜, X˜)P˜ and QX|S,U,V =
P˜X = PX , where the subscript P˜ means that the random variables on the RHS are distributed according to their
marginal from (178). Consequently, QU,V,X|SWS1,S2|SWY,Z|X equals to the RHS of (178). We next evaluate the
mutual information term in RA from (22) and show it coincides with 32. In doing so, we once again make use of
the notation IQ, IP˜ and IP to indicated that a mutual information term is taken with respect to the PMF Q, P˜ or
P , respectively. We have
IQ(V ;Y, S1|U)− IQ(V ;Z, S2|U) = IP˜ (A,B;Y, S1|B˜, X˜)− IP˜ (A,B;Z, S2|B˜, X˜)
(a)
= IP (A;S1|B,X) + IP (A;Y |B,X, S1)− IP (A;S2|B,X)
− IP (A;Z|B,X, S2)
(b)
= IP (A;S1|B)− IP (A;S2|B) (179)
where (a) is because B˜ = B and X˜ = X with probability 1 and since P˜S,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z = PS,A,B,X,S1,S2,Y,Z .
Step (b) is because in P the chain (Y, Z)−X − (A,B, S1, S2) is Markov.
Next, consider
IQ(U, V ;Y, S1)− IQ(U, V ;S) = IP˜ (A,B, B˜, X˜ ;Y, S1)− IP˜ (A,B, B˜, X˜ ;S)
(a)
= IP (A,B,X ;Y, S1)− IP (A,B,X ;S)
(b)
= IP (A,B,X ;Y |S1)− IP (A,B;S|S1)
(c)
= IP (X ;Y )− IP (A;S|S1) (180)
where:
(a) is for the same reason as step (a) in the derivation of (179);
(b) is because in P we have the Markov chain (A,B,X)− S − S1, since X is independent of (A,B, S, S1) and
due to the chain rule;
(c) follows because (X,Y ) is independent of (A,B, S1) and since I(B;S|S1, A) = 0 as B − A− (S, S1) is also
a Markov chain.
Finally, we shown that the third term from the RHS of (177) is redundant by establishing that IQ(V ;S|U) ≥
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IQ(V ;Z, S2|U), for the aforementioned choice of QU,V,X|S . Consider
IQ(V ;Z, S2|U)
(a)
= IP (A;S2|B)
≤ IP (A;S, S2|B)
(b)
= IP (A,B;S)− I(B;S)
(c)
= IP (A;S|B,X)
(d)
= IQ(A;S|B,X) (181)
where:
(a) is due to similar arguments as those justifying (179);
(b) is because (A,B)− S − S2 forms a Markov chain in P ;
(c) is by the independence of (A,B, S) and X ;
(d) follows from the definition of the QU,V,X|S distribution.
Consequently, the third term in RRLN
A
(QU,V,X|S) is redundant due to (180), which along with (179) establishes
the direct part of Corollary 1.
B. Converse
Let
{
cn
}
n∈N
be a sequence of (n,R) semantically-secure codes for the SD-WTC with a vanishing maximal
error probability. Fix ǫ > 0 and let n ∈ N be sufficiently large so that (21) is satisfied. Since both (21a) and (21b)
hold for any message distribution PM ∈ P(M), in particular, they hold for a uniform P
(U)
M . All the following
multi-letter mutual information and entropy terms are calculated with respect to the induced joint PMF from (17),
where the channel WY,Z|X,S is replaced with WS1,S2,Y,Z|X,S defined in Section V-B2. Fano’s inequality gives
H(M |Sn1 , Y
n) ≤ 1 + nǫR , nǫn, (182)
where ǫn =
1
n + ǫR.
The security criterion from (21b) and the reversely less noisy property of the channel WY,Z|X (that, respectively,
justify the two following inequalities) further gives
ǫ ≥ I(M ;Sn2 , Z
n)
= I(M ;Sn2 ) +
∑
s2∈Sn2
WnS2(s2)I(M ;Z
n|Sn2 = s2)
≥ I(M ;Sn2 ) +
∑
s2∈Sn2
WnS2(s2)I(M ;Y
n|Sn2 = s2)
= I(M ;Sn2 , Y
n). (183)
Having (182) and (183), we bound R as
nR = H(M)
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(a)
≤ I(M ;Sn1 , Y
n)− I(M ;Sn2 , Y
n) + nδn
= I(M ;Sn1 |Y
n)− I(M ;Sn2 |Y
n) + nδn
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ;Si1, S
n
2,i+1|Y
n)− I(M ;Si−11 , S
n
2,i|Y
n)
]
+ nδn
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ;S1,i|S
i−1
1 , S
n
2,i+1, Y
n)− I(M ;S2,i|S
i−1
1 , S
n
2,i+1, Y
n)
]
+ nδn
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M ;S1,i|Bi)− I(M ;S2,i|Bi)
]
+ nδn
(d)
= n
n∑
i=1
PT (i)
[
I(M ;S1,T |BT , T = i)− I(M ;S2,T |BT , T = i)
]
+ nδn
= n
[
I(M ;S1,T |BT , T )− I(M ;S2,T |BT , T )
]
+ nδn
(e)
= n
[
I(A;S1|B)− I(A;S2|B)
]
+ nδn (184)
where:
(a) is by (182) and (183) while setting δn , ǫn +
ǫ
n ;
(b) is a telescoping identity [25, Eqs. (9) and (11)];
(c) defined Bi , (S
i−1
1 , S
n
2,i+1, Y
n), for all i ∈ [1 : n]. (d) is by introducing a time-sharing random variable T that
is uniformly distributed over the set [1 : n] and is independent of all the other random variables in P (cn);
(e) defines S , ST , S1 , S1,T , S2 , S2,T , X , XT , Y , YT , Z , ZT , B , (BT , T ) and A , (M,B).
Another way to bound R is
nR = H(M)
(a)
≤ I(M ;Sn1 , Y
n) + nǫn
= I(M ;Sn1 , Y
n, Sn)− I(M ;Sn|Sn1 , Y
n) + nǫn
(b)
= I(M ;Y n|Sn1 , S
n)− I(M,Y n;Sn|Sn1 ) + I(S
n;Y n|Sn1 ) + nǫn
= I(M,Sn;Y n|Sn1 )− I(M,Y
n;Sn|Sn1 ) + nǫn
(c)
≤ I(M,Sn;Y n)− I(M,Y n;Sn|Sn1 ) + nǫn
(d)
≤ I(Xn;Y n)− I(M,Y n;Sn|Sn1 ) + nǫn
(e)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Yi)− I(M,Y
n;Si|S
n
1 , S
i−1)
]
+ nǫn
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Yi)− I(M,Y
n, S
n\i
1 , S
i−1;Si|S1,i)
]
+ nǫn
(g)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Xi;Yi)− I(M,Bi;Si|S1,i)
]
+ nǫn
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(h)
= n
n∑
i=1
PT (i)
[
I(XT ;YT |T = i)− I(M,BT ;ST |S1,T , T = i)
]
+ nǫn
(i)
≤ n
[
I(XT ;YT )− I(M,BT , T ;ST |S1,T )
]
+ nǫn
(j)
≤ n
[
I(X ;Y )− I(A;S|S1)
]
+ nǫn (185)
where:
(a) is by (182);
(b) uses the independence of M and (Sn1 , S
n) (1st term);
(c) is because conditioning cannot increase entropy and since Y n− (M,Sn)−Sn1 forms a Markov chain (1st term);
(d) uses the Markov relation Y n −Xn − (M,Sn);
(e) follows since conditioning cannot increase entropy and by the discrete and memoryless property of the WTC
WnY,Z|X ;
(f) is because P
(cn)
Sn,Sn1 ,S
n
2
= WnS,S1,S2 , i.e., the marginal distribution of (S
n, Sn1 , S
n
2 ) are i.i.d.;
(g) is by the definition of Bi;
(h) follows for the same reason as step (d) in the derivation of (184);
(i) is because conditioning cannot increase entropy and the Markov relation YT −XT − T (1st term), and because
P
(
ST = s, S1,T = s1, T = t
)
= WS,S1(s, s1)PT (t), for all (s, s1, t) ∈ S × S1 × [1 : n] (2nd term);
(j) reuses the definition of the single-letter random variable from step (e) in the derivation of (184).
The joint distribution of the defined random variables factors as
P
(
S = s, S1 = s1, S2 = s2, A = a,B = b,X = x, Y = y, Z = z
)
= WS(s)WS1,S2|S(s1, s2|s)P
(
A = a
∣∣S = s, S1 = s1, S2 = s2)P(B = b∣∣A = a)
× P
(
X = x
∣∣S = s, S1 = s1, S2 = s2, A = a,B = b)WY,Z|X(y, z|x), (186)
where the equalities P
(
S = s, S1 = s1, S2 = s2
)
= WS(s)WS1,S2|S(s1, s2|s) and P
(
Y = y, Z = z
∣∣S = s, S1 =
s1, S2 = s2, A = a,B = b,X = x
)
=WY,Z|X(y, z|x) are straightforward from the probabilistic relations in P
(cn)
and the definition of the random variable T , while P
(
B = b
∣∣S = s, S1 = s1, S2 = s2, A = a) = P(B = b∣∣A = a)
follows because A = (M,B). Furthermore, for every (s, s1, s2, a) ∈ S × S1 ×S2 ×A, it holds that P
(
A = a
∣∣S =
s, S1 = s1, S2 = s2
)
= P
(
A = a
∣∣S = s). To see this, for any (sn, sn1 , sn2 , yn) ∈ Sn × Sn1 × Sn2 × Yn, we define
the corresponding realization of A as a = (t,m, bt), where (t,m) ∈ [1 : n] ∈Mn and bt =
(
yn, st−11 , s
n
2,t+1
)
. Let
(st, s1,t, s2,t) ∈ S × S1 × S2 (the and obtain
P
(
A = a
∣∣S = st, S1 = s1,t, S2 = s2,t)
(a)
= PT (t)P
(cn)
(
m, st−11 , s
n
2,t+1, y
n|st, s1,t, s2,t
)
= PT (t)
∑
(sn\t,xn)∈Sn−1×Xn
P (cn)
(
sn\t, xn,m, st−11 , s
n
2,t+1, y
n
∣∣∣st, st1, sn2,t,m)
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(b)
= PT (t)PM (m)
∑
(sn\t,xn)∈Sn−1×Xn
Wn−1S
(
sn\t
)
W t−1S1|S
(
st−11 |s
t−1
)
Wn−tS2|S
(
sn2,t+1|s
n
t+1
)
× fn
(
xn
∣∣m, sn)WnY |X (yn|xn)
= PT (t)P
(cn)
(
m, st−11 , s
n
2,t+1, y
n|st
)
= P
(
A = a
∣∣S = st) (187)
where (a) is because T is independent of all the other random variables, while (b) uses the dependence relations
in P (cn) from (17) with WS1,S2|SWY,Z|X in the role of the SDWTC.
Denoting P
(
A = a
∣∣S = s) , PA|S(a|s), P(B = b∣∣A = a) , PB|A(b|a) and P(X = x∣∣S = s, S1 = s1, S2 =
s2, A = a,B = b
)
, PX|S,S1,S2,A,B(x|s, s1, s2, a, b), we have the following bound on the achievable rate
R ≤
min
{
I(A;S1|B)− I(A;S2|B), I(X ;Y )− I(A;S|S1)
}
1− ǫ
+
1
(1 − ǫ)n
+
ǫ
1− ǫ
, (188)
where the mutual information terms are calculated with respect to the joint PMF
WSWS1,S2|SPA|SPB|APX|S,S1,S2,A,BWY,Z|X . However, noting that in none of the mutual information terms from
(188) do X and (S, S1, S2, A,B) appear together, we may replace PX|S,S1,S2,A,B with PX without affecting the
expressions. Taking ǫ→ 0 and n→∞ completes the proof of the converse.
APPENDIX D
CONVERSE PROOF FOR COROLLARY 2
Let
{
cn
}
n∈N
be a sequence of (n,R) for the SD-WTC satisfying (21). By similar arguments to those presented
in the converse proof from Appendix C-B, we assume a uniform message distribution and note that all the following
multi-letter mutual information and entropy terms are take with respect to (17). By Fano’s inequality, we have
H(M |Y n) ≤ 1 + nǫR , nǫn, (189)
where ǫn =
1
n + ǫR.
First, we bound the rate R as
nR = H(M)
(a)
≤ I(M ;Y n)− I(M ;Zn) + nǫ′n
≤ I(M ;Y n|Zn) + nǫ′n
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi) + nǫ
′
n (190)
where (a) uses (21b) and (189) and defines ǫ′n , ǫn +
ǫ
n , and (b) follows by the chain rule and since conditioning
cannot increase entropy.
Another way to bound R is as follows.
nR = H(M)
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(a)
≤ I(M ;Y n)− I(M ;Sn) + nǫn
≤ I(M ;Y n|Sn) + nǫ′n
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Yi|Si) + nǫn (191)
where (a) is due to (189) and because M and Sn are independent in (17), while (b) is justified similarly to step
(b) in (190). Having (190)-(191), the converse is established by standard time-sharing argument (as in the proof of
Corollary 1 from Appendix C).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Property (1) essentially follows because X and Y are connected by a BSC(α), with α ∈
(
0, 12
)
. The independence
of Y and S means that
PY |S(0|s) = PY |S(0|s
′), ∀(s, s′) ∈ S2, (192)
and assume by contradiction that a similar relation does not hold for S and X . Namely, assume that there exists a
pair (s, s′) ∈ S2, such that
PX|S(0|s) 6= PX|S(0|s
′). (193)
Denote PX|S(0|s) = γ and PX|S(0|s
′) = γ′, where γ, γ′ ∈ [0, 1] and γ 6= γ′. Consider the following:
PY |S(0|s)
(a)
= PX|S(0|s)WY |X(0|0) + PX|S(1|s)WY |X(0|1)
= γ(1− α) + (1− γ)α
, γ ∗ α (194)
where (a) is because S −X − Y forms a Markov chain. By repeating similar steps for PY |S(0|s
′), we get
PY |S(0|s
′) = γ′(1− α) + (1 − γ′)α. (195)
Combining (194)-(195) with (192) gives that γ = γ′, which is a contradiction. Therefore S and X must be
independent.
For the second property in Lemma 2, recall that from the equality in step (e) of (49), we have that X−(V, S)−Y ,
i.e.,
PX,Y |V,S(x, y|v, s) = PX|V,S(x|v, s)PY |V,S(y|v, s), ∀(v, s, x, y) ∈ V × S × X × Y. (196)
However, the Markov chain (V, S)−X − Y also holds, which means that PX,Y |V,S factors as
PX,Y |V,S(x, y|v, s) = PX|V,S(x|v, s)WY |X(y|x), ∀(v, s, x, y) ∈ V × S × X × Y. (197)
Therefore, for every (v, s, x, y) ∈ V × S × X × Y either PX|V,S(x|v, s) = 0 or PY |V,S(y|v, s) = WY |X(y|x). In
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particular, for (x, y) = (1, 1) and any (v, s) ∈ V × S, either
PX|V,S(1|v, s) = 0 (198a)
or
PY |V,S(1|v, s) = WY |X(1|1) = α¯. (198b)
If (198b) holds, we have
PY |V,S(1|v, s)
(a)
= PX|V,S(0|v, s)WY |X(1|0) + PX|V,S(1|v, s)WY |X(1|1)
= αPX|V,S(0|v, s) + α¯PX|V,S(1|v, s)
= α+ (1 − 2α)PX|V,S(1|v, s) (199)
where (a) uses the Markov chain (V, S)−X − Y . When combined with (198b), this gives
PX|V,S(1|v, s) = 1. (200)
Thus, for any (v, s) ∈ V × S either (198a) or (200) is true, which implies that there exists f : V × S → X such
that X = f(V, S).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The derivation of Property (1) from Lemma 3 follows the exact same line presented in the proof of Property (2)
from Lemma 2 (see Appendix E), while replacing (V, S) in the latter proof with V only. The proof is, therefore,
omitted.
Proving Properties (2) and (3) of the lemma is also reminiscent of the proof of Lemma 2. However, here slight
modifications of the arguments are needed. For completeness, the details are as follows.
To see that the independence of S1 and Y implies that S and Y are also independent (Property (2)), note that
the former independence implies
PS1|Y (1|y) = PS1|Y (1|y
′). ∀(y, y′) ∈ Y2, (201)
Assume by contradiction that there exists a pair (y, y′) ∈ Y2, such that
PS|Y (1|y) 6= PS|Y (1|y
′). (202)
Denote PS|Y (1|y) = δ and PS|Y (1|y
′) = δ′, where δ, δ′ ∈ [0, 1] and δ 6= δ′. We have
PS1|Y (1|y)
(a)
= PS|Y (0|y)WS1|S(1|0) + PS|Y (1|y)WS1|S(1|1)
(b)
= δ(1 − σ) (203)
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where (a) is because Y −S−S1 forms a Markov chain, while (b) is since WS1|S is a BEC(σ), which in particular
means that WS1|S(1|0) = 0. Similar steps also give
PS1|Y (1|y
′) = δ′(1 − σ). (204)
Combining (203)-(204) with (201) gives that δ = δ′, which is a contradiction. Therefore S and Y are independent,
which establishes Property (2) of the lemma.
For Property (3), recall that from the equality in step (d) of (51), we have that S − (V, Y )− S1, i.e.,
PS,S1|V,Y (s, s1|v, y) = PS|V,Y (s|v, y)PS1|V,Y (s1|v, y), ∀(v, y, s, s1) ∈ V × Y × S × S1. (205)
Now, since the Markov chain (V, Y )− S − S1 also holds, another factorization of PS,S1|V,Y is
PS,S1|V,Y (s, s1|v, y) = PS|V,Y (s|v, y)WS1|S(s1|s), ∀(v, y, s, s1) ∈ V × Y × S × S1. (206)
As before, (205)-(206) imply that for every (v, y, s, s1) ∈ V × Y × S × S1 either PS|V,Y (s|v, y) = 0 or
PS1|V,Y (s1|v, y) =WS1|S(s1|s). Taking (s, s1) = (1, 1), we see that for any (v, y) ∈ V × Y , either
PS|V,Y (1|v, y) = 0 (207a)
or
PS1|V,Y (1|v, y) = WS1|S(1|1) = σ¯. (207b)
If (198b) holds, we have
PS1|V,Y (1|v, y)
(a)
= PS|V,Y (0|v, y)WS1|S(1|0) + PS|V,Y (1|v, y)WS1|S(1|1)
(b)
= σ¯PS|V,Y (1|v, y) (208)
where (a) uses the Markov chain (V, Y )−S−S1 and (b) is because WS1|S is a BEC(σ). Along with (207b), (208)
implies that
PS|V,Y (1|v, y) = 1. (209)
Concluding, for any (v, y) ∈ V × Y either (207a) or (209) is true. This means that there exists g2 : V × Y → S
such that S = g2(V, Y ).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The proof uses several basic properties of Re´nyi divergence (see, e.g., [26]). First, recall that for fixed measures µ
and ν, dα(µ, ν) is monotone non-decreasing in α. Furthermore, if µ≪ ν then dα(µ, ν) is contineous in α ∈ (1,∞].
Since a joint PMF is always absolutely contineous with respect to the product of its marginals and by the choices
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of δ1 and δ2, there exists α1, α2 > 1 such that
R1 − δ1 > dα1(QU,W , QU , QW ) ≥ d1(QU,W , QU , QW ) = I(U ;W ), (210a)
R1 +R2 − δ2 > dα2(QU,V,W , QU,V , QW ) ≥ d1(QU,V,W , QU,V , QW ) = I(U, V ;W ). (210b)
On account of (210), by setting α = min{α1, α2}, we conclude that β
(j)
α,δj
> 0, for j = 1, 2.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
First note that for any PM ∈ P(Mn), Bn and (i, j,m, s) ∈ In × Jn ×Mn × S
n, we have
Γ(Bn)(i, j|m, s) =
Γ(Bn)(m, i, j, s)
Γ(Bn)(m, s)
=
∑
(u,v)∈Un×Vn
PM (m)2
−n(R1+R2)1{
u(i)=u
}
∩
{
v(i,j,m)=v
}QnS|U,V (s|u,v)∑
(i′,j′,u′,v′)∈In×Jn×Un×Vn
PM (m)2−n(R1+R2)1{
u(i′)=u′
}
∩
{
v(i′,j′,m)=v′
}QnS|U,V (s|u′,v′)
=
QnS|U,V
(
s
∣∣u(i),v(i, j,m))∑
(i′,j′)∈In×Jn
QnS|U,V
(
s
∣∣u(i′),v(i′, j′,m))
(a)
= P (Bn)(i, j|m, s) (211)
where (a) is by the definition from (101). Having (211), note that
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z − Γ(Bn)M,S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
(a)
=
∑
m∈Mn
PM (m)
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z|M=m − Γ(Bn)S,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z|M=m∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
(b)
=
∑
m∈Mn
PM (m)
∣∣∣∣∣∣WnS − Γ(Bn)S|M=m∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣WnS − Γ(Bn)S|M=m∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
(212)
where (a) is because Γ
(Bn)
M = P
(Bn)
M = PM , while (b) is based on the property of total variation that for any
PX , QX ∈ P(X ) and PY |X : X → P(Y) we have
∣∣∣∣PXPY |X −QXPY |X ∣∣∣∣TV = ∣∣∣∣PX −QX ∣∣∣∣TV. Combining this
with (211) and the equalities
Γ
(Bn)
U,V|I,J,S,M=m = 1
{
U=u(i)
}
∩
{
V=V(I,J,m)
} = P (Bn)U,V|I,J,S,M=m (213a)
Γ
(Bn)
X,Y,Z|U,V,I,J,S,M=m = Q
n
X|U,V,SW
n
Y,Z|X,S = P
(Bn)
X,Y,Z|U,V,I,J,S,M=m. (213b)
justifies (b).
Now, for any α˜ > 0 and sufficiently large n consider
P
(∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)S,M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z − Γ(Bn)S,M,I,J,U,V,X,Y,Z∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nα˜
)
(a)
≤ P
(
max
m∈Mn
∣∣∣∣∣∣WnS − Γ(Bn)S|M=m∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
> e−nα˜
)
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(b)
≤ P
(
max
m∈Mn
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
S|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣WnS ) > 2e−2nα˜
)
(c)
≤
∑
m∈Mn
P
(
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
S|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣WnS ) > e−2nα˜
)
,
(214)
where (a) is due to (212), while (b) follows by Pinsker’s Inequality that states that for any two measures µ, ν on a
measurable space (X ,F), it holds that
∣∣∣∣µ− ν∣∣∣∣
TV
≤
√
1
2
D
(
µ
∣∣∣∣ν). (215)
Consequently, if the total variation does not converge then the same is true for the corresponding relative entropy.
Finally, (c) uses the union bound.
To conclude the proof note that each of the summands on the RHS of (214) falls within the framework of the
strong SCL for superposition codes (Lemma 1), with respect to the DMC QnS|U,V . Therefore, taking (R1, R2) as
in (106) implies that there exist γ1, γ2 > 0 and an n0 ∈ N, such that for any n > n0
P
(
D
(
Γ
(Bn)
S|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣WnS ) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (216)
The stronger result from Lemma 7 (i.e., (107)) then follows from (214) and (216) for α1 =
γ1
2 and α2 = γ2. To
get (108), we use [12, Lemma 2], where it is stated that the stronger version of the SCL indeed implies Wyner’s
original notion of soft-covering where the convergence is of the expected value.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Fix PM ∈ P(Mn) and consider∣∣∣IP (M ;Z)− IΓ(M ;Z)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣HP (M) +HP (Z)−HP (M,Z)−HΓ(M)−HΓ(Z) +HΓ(M,Z)∣∣∣
(a)
≤
∣∣∣HP (Z) −HΓ(Z)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣HΓ(M,Z)−HP (M,Z)∣∣∣
(b)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Z − Γ(Bn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
log
|Zn|∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Z − Γ(Bn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,Z − Γ(Bn)M,Z∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
log
|Mn| · |Z
n|∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,Z − Γ(Bn)M,Z∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
(c)
≤ e−nδ1
(
n log |Z|+ n log
(
2R|Z|
))
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Z − Γ(Bn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
log
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Z − Γ(Bn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,Z − Γ(Bn)M,Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
log
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,Z − Γ(Bn)M,Z∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
(217)
where (a) is because HP (M) = HΓ(M) and due to the triangle inequality, (b) uses [27, Theorem 17.3.3], while
(c) follows by the assumption in (122).
Note that the function x 7→ −x log x is monotone increasing for x ∈
[
0, 2−
1
ln 2
]
and that there exists an n˜1 ∈ N
such that e−nδ1 ∈
[
0, 2−
1
ln 2
]
, for all n > n˜1. Finally, since
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Z −Γ(Bn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,Z −Γ(Bn)M,Z∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ e−nδ1 ,
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we have that for all n > n˜1
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Z − Γ(Bn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
log
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)Z − Γ(Bn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,Z− Γ(Bn)M,Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
log
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Bn)M,Z− Γ(Bn)M,Z∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ −2e−nδ1 log e−nδ1 .
(218)
Plugging (218) into (217) gives
∣∣∣IP (M ;Z)− IΓ(M ;Z)∣∣∣ ≤ ne−nδ1 (2 log |Z|+R+ 2δ1 1
ln 2
)
. (219)
Letting n˜2 ∈ N be such that δ2 , δ1 −
ln n˜2+ln(2 log |Z|+R+2δ1 1ln 2 )
n˜2
> 0, the result of Lemma 8 follows by setting
n1 = max{n0, n˜1, n˜2}.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Throughout this proof we denote the entropy of a random variable X ∼ PX , where PX ∈ P(X ), by H(PX)
instead of HP (X) that was used before. Consider the following:
∣∣∣D(PY|X∣∣∣∣QnY |X ∣∣PX)∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈supp(PY|X=x)
PY|X(y|x) log
PY|X(y|x)
QnY |X(y|x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x)
∣∣∣∣H(PY|X=x)−H(QnY |X=x)
+
∑
y∈supp(PY|X=x)
PY|X(y|x) logQ
n
Y |X(y|x) −
∑
y∈supp(PY|X=x)
QnY |X(y|x) logQ
n
Y |X(y|x)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x)
[∣∣∣H(PY|X=x)−H(QnY |X=x)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣EPY|X=x logQnY |X(Y|x) − EQnY|X=x logQnY |X(Y|x)∣∣∣
]
(a)
≤
∑
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x)
[∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV log |Y|n∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV
+ b(x) ·
∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV
]
(220)
where (a) uses [27, Theorem 17.3.3] and [9, Property (b)]) that was mention in the Average Error Probability
Analysis in Section VI-B, where the bound on the functions range is b(x) = maxy∈supp(PY|X=x)
∣∣∣ logQnY |X(y|x)∣∣∣.
For any x ∈ supp(PX), we bound b(x) from above as follows. First note that logQ
n
Y |X(y|x) ≤ 0, for every
y ∈ supp(PY|X=x). Then, recall that PY|X=x ≪ Q
n
Y |X=x, for all x ∈ supp(PX), and therefore, supp(PY|X=x) ⊆
supp(QnY |X=x). Thus, for every y ∈ supp supp(PY|X=x) we have that yi ∈ supp(QY |X=xi), for all i ∈ [1 : n],
and so
b(x) ≥ logQnY |X(y|x) ≥ log
(
n∏
i=1
min
y∈supp(QY |X=xi )
QY |X(y|xi)
)
≥ n log

 min
(x,y)∈X×Y:
QY |X (y|x)>0
QY |X(y|x)

 > −∞.
(221)
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Denoting µY |X , min (x,y)∈X×Y:
QY |X (y|x)>0
QY |X(y|x) we have that
b(x) ≤ n logµY |X , (222)
uniformly in x ∈ supp(PX). Substituting (222) into the RHS of (220), we obtain∣∣∣D(PY|X∣∣∣∣QnY |X ∣∣PX)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣PXPY|X − PXQnY |X ∣∣∣∣TV(n log |Y|+ n logµY |X)
−
∑
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x)
∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV log ∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV. (223)
We further upper bound the last term in (220) using Jensen’s inequality. For each x ∈ supp(PX), denote t(x) ,∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV and let T , {t(x)}x∈supp(PX). The PMF PX induces a PMF PT ∈ P(T ) defined by
PT (t) =
∑
x∈supp(PX):
t(x)=t
PX(x). (224)
With respect to the above, we have
−
∑
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x)
∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV log ∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV = −∑
t∈T
PT (t) · t log t
(a)
≤ −
(∑
t∈T
tPT (t)
)
log
(∑
t∈T
tPT (t)
)
,
(225)
where (a) follows by Jensen’s inequality applied on the concave function t 7→ −t log t. Finally, the proof is concluded
by noting that
∑
t∈T
tPT (t) =
∑
x∈supp(PX)
PX(x)
∣∣∣∣PY|X=x −QnY |X=x∣∣∣∣TV = ∣∣∣∣PXPY|X − PXQnY |X ∣∣∣∣TV, (226)
and inserting (225) into (223).
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